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This thesis examines the role of rhetoric and narratives in management.  This topic is of 
vital importance because managers use narratives to give perspective and meaning to the 
events and goals of the organization (Bonet & Sauquet, 2010).  Managers shape and 
change the symbols that constitute meanings of past events and they create narratives to 
form the future of the organization (Gabriel, 2000; Boje, 2001; Nadal-Burgues & Bonet 
2016).  Therefore, in addition to the functions of controlling, planning, and coordinating 
actions, the premise of this thesis is that deliberate engagement in rhetoric and the creation 
of compelling narratives is generally an important managerial function.  When the 
organization is challenged with uncertainty and change, it is conceivable that this function 
attains critical importance.  
Given this outline of the topic of the thesis, the broader objective of this research is to 
improve our understanding of the role of rhetoric and narratives in management practice.  
As rhetoric and narratives are typically invoked to create meaning in uncertain situations 
and to shape a possible path to the future, this broader objective will be subject to a 
detailed examination based on the following research questions. What is the role of 
narratives in uncertain conditions?  How do narratives facilitate change projects?   
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1.1. A review of the concept of the Narratives 
For long, stories and narratives have not been regarded as proper methods of research in 
social sciences, nor were they seen as an intellectual subject.  They were considered a 
secondary genre, suited for folk tales and children entertainment.  The first seeds of 
change in this perspective were planted by the works of Vladimir Propp (1895-1970), the 
Russian formalist, who introduced “The morphology of the folktale” (1928).  An in-depth 
study of classes of events in stories, lead him to conclude that all marvellous tales are 
made of the same structure, i.e. classes of events following each other, with more 
superficial variations such as time, place, and characters, laid over the basic skeleton.  To 
classify the basic elements of the structure, Popp moved from the specifics to the general 
through abstraction, introducing concepts such as absentation, which refers to the hero 
leaving their town/habitat.  His contribution was well appreciated and, in the 1960es, this 
line of thought was pursued in the works of the French structuralist, Claude Levi-Strauss, 
as he examined the structure of myths worldwide and through history (1969).  More 
recently, Hayden White, literary critic and historian, in his book “The Content of the 
Form” (1987) asserted that only through narratives could history have meaning.  To 
illustrate this, he compared three historic forms of annals, chronicles, and tales/stories.  
Annals only report the year, plus the event.  Chronicles report the years and the relation 
of events, and finally, stories use the structure of chronicles but have two distinct 
additions: first, the events in stories are organized in plots, and second, they have a 
narrative ending.  The addition of these two attributes allows meaning to history.  In other 
words, annals are not the way we think of history, since recording the year and an event 
does not mean much; however, narrative endings and plots enable histories to have 
meaning, and altering each element would change the meaning of the whole.  
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Creation of meaning points at the importance of stories in our understanding of the world.  
For instance, Jerome Bruner (1991) argues that knowledge comes in two types: scientific 
knowledge and narrative knowledge, and the two are complementary, unable to substitute 
the other.  Stories are important in other ways, specifically, for human action.  As per 
Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), every action is made of a purpose, a mental project, and an 
act.  The final act itself cannot express the full meaning, since meaning is created through 
the interpretation of the purpose and the mental project.  The mental project is used as a 
rehearsal of the act: it enlists the elements of how, where, when, and by whom an action 
would take place.  Since the purpose and the mental project are exclusive to the actor’s 
mind, the only access to the meaning is through interpretation.  Every act can have three 
meanings, coming from the interpretation of three various sources: the actor, the 
correspondent, and the external observer.  This is an accepted basic view in interpretative 
methods in social sciences, with emphasis on the interpretations from the actor, and the 
scientific researcher (the external observer).  So, through studying these two perspectives 
on the meaning of an act, one can understand the concept of double hermeneutics in social 
sciences.  Alfred Schutz did not use the concept of stories; however, this dissertation is 
based on the principle that the mental project of an action has the structure of a story, with 
a plot and a narrative ending.  In other words, to the actor, the meaning of an action is the 
meaning that s/he creates through planning the mental project, which could be expressed 
by a story.   
The conceptual background of the dissertation is inspired and influenced by the 
Conference of Rhetoric and Narratives in Management Research (RNMR), held 
biannually at ESADE Business School, specifically, the sessions in 2011 and 2013.  The 
philosophical concepts introduced by Hans Sigaard Jensen (2011), the relation between 
narratives and intentional action by Eduard Bonet (2014), and the study of intentional 
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action, creativity, and research by Nuria Nadal-Burgués (2015) have been the main 
background and source of the dialogue started here.   
 
1.2. A Review of Organizational Change Theories 
Change and its consequences constitute the history of mankind.  It is neither new nor 
surprising to observe change in organizations.  The newness of this topic, however, 
originates from the perspectives and angles taken at it.  Weick and Quinn (1999, p. 362) 
laid it out as “the distinction between change that is episodic, discontinuous, and 
intermittent and change that is continuous, evolving, and incremental”.  Van de Ven and 
Poole (2005) classify theories of change into four categories, based on their take on the 
ontology of organizations, i.e. viewing organizations as thing versus process, and 
variance and process epistemologies, i.e. focus on the change outcome versus the process 
of change.  There is also the matter of planning, Porras and Robertson (1992) suggested 
that organizational change can be approached based on whether or not it was planned, 
and came up with four possibilities to classify change: developmental, transformational, 
evolutionary, and revolutionary.  
In any case, understanding change requires observing the state of the organization as it 
is, and through time, with regard to events that alter the state of matters from one point in 
time to another (Ford & Ford, 1994).  This treatment of the topic of organizational change 
is central to understanding our own human existence; people have, through time, yearned 
to create a pleasant and plausible story about the “journey” of life and it is ultimate “goal” 
or meaning.  In other words, we are constantly reviewing the effects of events in our 
worlds, throughout the span of our life, to understand what we are supposed to become 
and what we have actually become.  
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One good reason for this enthusiasm with understanding the phenomenon of change is, 
perhaps, the belief that understanding change is the only way to decipher the intricate 
details of how a system works (Lewin, 1951; Schein, 1996). Another reason originates 
from the belief that change is the essence of an organization, in that even routines and 
well-rehearsed performances are, in fact, constant improvisations and improvements 
(Orlikowski, 1996; Feldman, 2000).  Innovation and change creeps into almost all human 
acts, even when they are supposed to be repetitive.  Hence, understanding change and its 
bearings in an organization could pave the way to a clearer observation of the origins of 
routines, which are essential to the study of organizations (Nelson & Winter, 1982).    
James March’s second “footnote” to organizational change encompasses the need to 
study change in the way proposed in this dissertation: “Changes in organizations depend 
on a few stable processes.  Theories of change emphasise either the stability of the process 
or the changes they produce, but a serious understanding of organizations requires 
attention to both.” (March, 1981, p. 563).  The inherent uncertainty in the context and 
operations of an organization calls for agility to handle change, in process and produce, 
depending on the priorities of the firm at any given time.  Using Schutz’ concept of mental 
projects as a treatment to narratives of change, one can shift the priority on the process 
(the plot of the narrative), or the outcome/produce (the overall theme of the narrative). 
Nevertheless, shifting priorities should not cast a shadow on the vitality of understanding 
both issues of end and means. 
State of the art: The most notable empirical fact in studies of organization change is that 
the reported success rate of change programs has been rather low (Balogun & Hope 
Hailey, 2004). Even considering the most recent studies, it seems that the success of 
change programs is rare (Jacobs et al., 2013; Jansson, 2013; Michel et al., 2013). This 
observation indicates that something rather important is amiss in our knowledge of 
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change in organizations, at least to the extent that improved knowledge would inform 
change processes.  Whether it is lack of a more suitable framework to study change (By, 
2005; Rafferty et al., 2013), or reasons that lie beneath planning and implementation 
(Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008; Burnes & Jackson, 2011), the answers are still not clear.  
One plausible reason might point to the observation that while the study of organizational 
change has been a major topic in the past decade in the academic community (Dahl, 2011; 
Thomas & Hardy, 2011; Coget, 2010; Martin, Johnson, Cullen, 2009; Peus et. al., 2009), 
the topic of change management has not received the same attention in the major journals, 
since it is more oriented towards practitioners.  Nonetheless, practitioners and scholars 
have been looking for answers to successfully achieve organizational change during 
economic crises (Ashurst and Hodges, 2010).  Attention to an organization’s current 
standing and identity is regarded as a promising venue to study change (Brown et al., 
2005; Chreim, 2007; Landau and Drori, 2008; Moore, 2011).  The best suited method to 
delve into such matters is the qualitative method (Bartunek and Seo, 2002; Jones and 
Khanna, 2006; Edmondson and McManus, 2007; Shapiro et al., 2007), since it has the 
capacity to unfold the complexities of the relationship between an individual and the 
organization when it comes to questions of identity and communication (Shimoni and 
Bergmann, 2006; Garcia & Gluesing, 2013).  To this end, my dissertation uses narratives 
and stories to relate to the phenomenon of change, since every individual engaged with 
the change project has a different story, and every story effects the overall project in one 
way or another (Brown and Humphreys, 2003). 
 
1.3.Research Objectives and Questions 
Understanding the role of rhetoric and narratives in managing organizations, calls for 
responses to questions below: 
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• When are rhetoric and narratives needed in managerial work?  The first paper, 
“Rhetoric and No Control, a New Managerial Function”, suggests an answer to 
this question, using the concept of “stages of development” in problem 
formulation.  That is, in situations where exploration is the priority, such as 
innovation savvy firms or research organizations, the problem of what needs to 
be done is quite vague and abstract.  For example, the statement “we want to find 
a cure for autoimmune diseases” would require rhetorical openness, as the precise 
activity that leads to a specific outcome is yet unclear.  However, as the 
researchers work on persuading each other that a specific topic needs to be at 
focus, the scope of interpretations narrows, and, through rhetorical closure, a 
consensus on the problem at hand can be reached.  In other words, the decision to 
engage in openness or closure is based on what stage the problem is at, concrete 
or abstract. 
• What is the role of narratives in uncertain conditions, such as change?  Once it is 
agreed that uncertain situations and vague problems require openness, how should 
this required openness be addressed?  To investigate this question, the second 
paper, “The Road Not Taken: The Narratives of Action and Organizational 
Change”, compares two types of narratives regarding their approach to rhetorical 
openness.  The first narrative type has a rigid and clear plot but leaves a certain 
degree of vagueness to the outcome, therefore, it might have a variety of endings.  
The second narrative type stresses on a clear and fixed ending, while keeping a 
vague description of the process, therefore maintaining the flexibility of the plot 
and its openness to interpretation.  Depending on what the manager must control, 
either the final outcome or the process will remain flexible.  In other words, it 
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seems that keeping both, the final outcome and the process, either rigid or flexible 
at the same time, is not eventually a viable option. 
• How is a change project managed?  Supposing that the manager now knows what 
their priorities are, regarding the flexibilities and rigidities of their narratives, they 
would need to communicate it throughout the organization and oversee the project 
of change.  As an organization is not a unitary actor, the personal stories and 
interpretations of the members involved in the project of change are as important 
as the narratives of the instigators of change.  The third paper in this dissertation 
titled: “The Tale of Two Cases: Expanding the Behaviour Approach to the Firm” 
takes advantage of two case studies from neighbouring countries and follows their 
internationalization path, in order to compare their rhetoric and narratives 
regarding the organizational structure and communication. Despite their 
geographical proximity, it is revealed that the two have fewer practices in 
common than expected. 
One of the most interesting contributions of this project, is viewing freedom to formulate 
future plans by means of narratives as an irreplaceable factor in organizations. Not only 
is it an undeniable need in the face of uncertainties of an ever-changing environment, but 
also it seems to be a human desire, as the individuals will strive for it in one way or 
another. 
 
1.4. The Structure of the Thesis 
This dissertation contributes to research by three papers presented in the following 
chapters (as outlined above), which are closely related though corresponding on distinct 
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levels.  While each study a specific area of application, they all emphasis the need for 
narratives in organizational and management research.   
The first paper, “Rhetoric and no control: a new managerial function”1 explores the 
concept of rhetorical openness/closure in relation to the stage of a project; as consensus 
increases and problems become more specific and precise, rhetoric expression turns from 
open to closed.  In situations where rhetorical closure is not yet reached, variation in 
narratives is a crucial consideration in decision making.  As a project moves from the 
vague to clear formulation of problem, the rhetoric shifts from abstract to concrete, with 
fewer opportunities for interpretive openness and higher chances of consensus on a single 
narrative as the plan for the future.  The fact that rhetorical means of persuasion open the 
variety of options for a problem to be solved and through consensus they decrease the 
assortment of interpretations that might rise during the time of openness, suggests that 
only a few of the options are fit to be pursued at any given time and that interpretative 
methods are suitable to disclose them.  Once uncertainty is reduced and a few options are 
chosen, traditional management forms turn out to be more suitable.  In the absence of 
clarity, interpretative flexibility and openness turn into a new managerial function to cope 
with novelty, innovation and high uncertainty levels.   
The second paper, “The road not taken: the narratives of action and organizational 
change” focuses on the same issue, but at the communication level, using Schutz’s 
formulation of human intentional action, which comprises of elements that are closely 
comparable with a narrative form.  By observing and comparing the narratives of different 
actors, it can be concluded that through degrees of vagueness in the mental project, actors 
cope with the inherent uncertainty of their situations.  When making decisions, managers 
1An earlier version of this article was presented at Strategic Management Society, Special 
Conference, 2013, Lake Geneva, and published in the proceedings of DRUID Annual 
Conference, 2013, Barcelona. 
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focus on the fit between the acts and the overall story of the firm.  This is examined 
through a case study of a Japanese MNE, where the subsidiary and HQ narrate their own 
stories, while maintain the overall identity of the firm.  It is shown that in situations where 
the desired final outcome or goal is clearly defined, managers practice their freedom in 
creating various narratives that change from one point in time to the other, while keeping 
the final goal as fixed.  On the other hand, if the procedures to reach a certain goal are 
communicated as the most important priority to the managers, they will then exercise 
their want for freedom to create numerous goals to fit those fixed procedures.  The author 
has come across two distinct types of narratives in this research.  The first type are the 
ones that emphasize the final goals, while leaving the means to reach the goals in some 
vagueness.  The second type are those that maintain the process with elaborate details, 
stressing the steps to reach the goal(s), while the final outcome is left in a shadow of 
ambiguity.  The first type of narratives acts to reduce the variety of interpretations 
regarding what the goal is, and stimulate the variety of interpretations of how to reach it.  
The second type, adversely, limit the range of interpretations about how to reach the goal, 
but leave the desired outcome vague.   
The third paper, “The tale of two cases: expanding the behaviour approach to the firm” 
takes the comparison a step further, by comparing the Japanese MNE with a Chinese 
counterpart.  It examines the premise of rhetoric and narratives as a general driver of 
strategic planning.  The results of the longitudinal case studies clearly show that their 
success or failure is not explainable by theories of international business only.  While 
current literature suggests that geographical proximity translates into similar 
organizational culture, our observation reveals that the two companies benefit from vastly 
diverse cultures, as a result of how their vision and goals are communicated across the 
international subsidiaries.  Despite their cultural and geographical proximity, the two 
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MNEs tell very different stories; one is willing to risk the foreign success at the price of 
strong internal identity while the other is more adaptable to the circumstances of the 
foreign markets.  The constraints placed on the stories that each respective manager can 
deliver dictates the decisions that each organization will make.  Viewing actions as 
narratives would require looking into the plan of an action, and how it unfolds in relation 
to the purpose of the aforementioned action.  Understanding change from the perspective 
of those who plan it and those who must go through it, and differentiating between the 
two, brings a number of interpretations and meanings to the project of organizational 
change that was neither foreseen, nor taken into account when the project was designed.  
In order to better understand the function of narratives in organizations, evidence from 
case studies are collected and compared.  They demonstrate that reaching consensus 
allows action, while lack of it could lead to divergent and/or conflicting actions.  The 
longitudinal case study is on a Japanese MNE, which was chosen because it was right at 
the beginning of the introduction of an international change program from the HQ that 
would have dire consequences for the operating branches.  Due to its size and its 
problematic management, there was a lot of confusion and chaos going on, which made 
it an intriguing case with high probabilities of failure.  Furthermore, the almost complete 
access to managers and their meetings, be it on a large scale or a one on one scale, made 
it an ideal case to study narratives and the use of them in a change situation.  
In the conclusion of the thesis, I sum up by outlining the contributions to research, 





    
1.5. References  
Al-Haddad, S. and T. Kotnour, (2015). Integrating the organizational change literature: a 
model for successful change, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 28(2), 
234-262. 
Ashurst, C. and J. Hodges, (2010). Exploring business transformation: the challenges of 
developing a benefits realization capability, Journal of Change Management, 10 (2), 217-
237. 
Balogun, J. and V. Hope Hailey, (2004).  Exploring Strategic Change, 2nd ed., Prentice Hall, 
London. 
Bartunek, J.M. and M.G. Seo, (2002). Qualitative research can add new meanings to 
quantitative research, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23, 237-242. 
Boje, D. M. (2001). Narrative Methods for Organizational & Communication Research. 
SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Bonet, E.  (2014). Exploring the boundaries of rhetoric. Journal of Organizational Change 
Management, 27(5), 703-806. 
Brown, A.D. and M. Humphreys, (2003). Epic and tragic tales: making sense of change, The 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 39(2), 121-144. 
Brown, A.D., M. Humphreys, and P.M. Gurney, (2005). Narrative, identity and change: a 
case study of Laskarina Holidays. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 18(4), 
312-326. 
Bruner, J. (1991). The Narrative Construction of Reality. Critical Inquiry, 18(1), 154-160. 
Burnes, B. and P. Jackson, (2011), Success and failure in organizational change: an 
exploration of the role of values, Journal of Change Management, 11 (2), 133-162. 
 12 
    
By, R.T. (2005). Organisational change management: a critical review, Journal of Change 
Management, 5 (4), 369-380. 
Chreim, S. (2007). Social and temporal influences on interpretations of organizational 
identity and acquisition integration: a narrative study. The Journal of Applied Behavioral 
Science, 43(4), 449-480. 
Coget, J.F. (2010). Performance orientation or learning orientation: which helps salespeople 
better adapt to organizational change?, Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(3), 
106-108. 
Dahl, M.S. (2011). Organizational change and employee stress, Management Science, 57(2), 
240-256. 
Edmondson, A.C. and S.E. McManus, (2007). Methodological fit in management field 
research, Academy of Management Review, 32(4), 1155-1179. 
Feldman, M. S. (2000). Organizational routines as a source of continuous change. 
Organization Science. Vol. 11. No. 6. pp. 611-629. 
Ford, J. D. and L. W. Ford (1994). Logics of identity, contradiction, and attraction in change. 
The Academy of Management Review. Vol. 19. No. 4. pp. 756-785. 
Gabriel, Y. (2000). Storytelling in Organizations: Facts, Fictions, and Fantasies. Oxford 
University Press.  
Garcia, D. and J.C. Gluesing, (2013). Qualitative research methods in international 
organizational change research, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 26(2), 
423-444. 
Jacobs, G., A. van Witteloostuijn, and J. Christe-Zeyse, (2013). A theoretical framework of 
organizational change, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 26 (5), 772-792. 
 13 
    
Jansson, N. (2013), Organizational change as practice: a critical analysis, Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, Vol. 26 No. 6, pp. 1003-1019. 
Jensen, H. S. (2011). The role of ambiguity in innovation. In E. Bonet, B. Czarniawska, D. 
McCloskey, & H. S. Jensen (Eds.), 2nd Conference on Rhetoric and Narratives in 
Management Research: Management and Persuasion (pp. 49–58). Barcelona, Spain: 
ESADE.  
Jones, G. and T. Khanna, (2006). Bringing history (back) into international business, Journal 
of International Business Studies, 37, 453-468. 
Kotter, J.P. and L.A. Schlesinger, (2008). Choosing strategies for change, Harvard Business 
Review, 86 (7), 130-139. 
Landau, D. and I. Drori, (2008). Narratives as sensemaking accounts: the case of an R&D 
laboratory, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 21(6), 701-720. 
Levi-Strauss, C. (1969). The Raw and the Cooked. Translated by John and Doreen 
Weightman. The University of Chicago Press. IL: Chicago. 
Lewin, K. (1951). Field theory in social science; selected theoretical papers. D. Cartwright 
(ed.). New York: Harper & Row. 
March, J. G. (1981). Footnotes to organizational change. Administrative Science Quarterly. 
Vol. 26. No. 4. pp. 563-577. 
Martin, K., J. Johnson, & J. Cullen, (2009). Organizational change, normative control 
deinstitutionalization, and corruption, Business Ethics Quarterly, 19(1), 105-130. 
Michel, A., R.T. By, and B. Burnes, (2013). The limitations of dispositional resistance in 
relation to organizational change, Management Decision, 51 (4), 761-780. 
Moore, C. (2011), The path to business process transformation, KM World, 20 (5), 6-7. 
 14 
    
Nadal-Burgués, N. (2015). Managing research projects: Judgement as a source of creativity. 
Doctoral Thesis. ESADE. Ramon Llull. 
Nelson, R. R. and S. G. Winter (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Orlikowski, W. J. (1996). Improvising organizational transformation over time: A situated 
change perspective. Information Systems Research. Vol. 7. No. 1. pp. 63-92. 
Peus, C., D. Frey, M. Gerkhardt, P. Fischer, & E. Traut-Mattausch, (2009), Leading and 
managing organizational change initiatives. Management Revue, 20(2), 158-175. 
Porras, J. I., and P. J. Robertson (1992). Organization development: Theory, practice, and 
research. In M. D. Dunnette & L. M. Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial and 
organizational psychology (2d ed.), vol. 3: 719-822. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press. 
Propp, V. (1928). The Morphology of the Folktale. Translation ©1968, The American 
Folklore Society and Indiana University. 
Rafferty, A.E., N.L. Jimmieson, and A.A. Armenakis, (2013), Change readiness: a 
multilevel review, Journal of Management, 39 (1), 110-135. 
Schein, E. (1996). Culture: The missing concept in organization studies. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 41. No. 2. pp. 229-240. 
Schutz, A. (1953). Common-sense and scientific interpretation of human action. Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research. Vol. 14. No. 1. pp. 1-38. 
Shapiro, D.L., M.A. Von Glinow, and Z. Xiao, (2007). Toward polycontextually sensitive 
research methods, Management and Organization Review, 3(1), 129-152. 
 15 
    
Shimoni, B. and H. Bergmann, (2006). Managing in a changing world: from 
multiculturalism to hybridization–the production of hybrid management cultures in 
Israel, Thailand, and Mexico, Academy of Management Perspectives, 20(3), 76-89. 
Thomas, R. and C. Hardy, (2011). Reframing resistance to organizational change, 
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 27(3), 322-331. 
Van de Ven, A. H. and M. S. Poole (2005). Alternative approaches for studying 
organizational change. Organization Studies. Vol. 26. No. 9. pp. 1377-1404.  
Weick, K. E. & R. E. Quinn (1999). Organizational change and development. Annual Review 
of Psychology. Vol. 50. pp. 361-386. 
White, H. (1987). The Content of the Form. The John Hopkins University Press. USA. 
  
 16 














While in the history of management we have been through many theories of organization 
structure, when it comes to management forms, we have adhered to a limited few.  This 
neglect brings some limitations to management of novelty, a crucial aspect for today’s 
organizations struggling to develop and innovate to create value (Birkinshaw, 2008).  
A few scholars in economics and management have made serious attempts to explain the 
limitations of the steady economy of “homus economicus” and the passive management 
perspective, which attempts to rationally control, plan, and coordinate production.  Joseph 
Schumpeter (1934) placed the entrepreneur in the centre of the economic life, obsessively 
seeking innovation and provoking change.  In contrast to the “economic man”, who 
calculates marginal costs and revenues based on known data, the entrepreneur must be a 
man of “vision”, willing to take chances, on the basis of intuition, on courses of action in 
opposition to the established patterns of the circular flow.  Alfred Chandler's (1962) idea 
that “structure follows strategy” placed the entrepreneur and his activity, which goes far 
beyond the development of functional tasks, in predominant lieu.  Kenneth Andrews 
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(1971) introduced the concept of corporate strategy and distinguished between the 
formulation and implementation of strategy.  Those are classical attempts to introduce a 
wider explanation of managerial activity through strategy. 
The bureaucratic organization is the fundamental structure of a firm, considered by Max 
Weber as the "ideal form”.  The main characteristics of, and requisites for, such ideal 
structure are rooted in assuming rationality and predictability through bureaucratic 
administration, legal formalism, and industrial capitalism (Weber, 1904).  At the 
beginning of the 20th century, Frederic Taylor (1911) and his peer Henry Fayol (1916) 
introduced a theory of management attached to the neoclassical economics approach 
where efficiency was achieved through rationally controlling, planning and coordinating 
the production.  Taylor’s Scientific Management was based in maximum specification 
and measurement of all organizational tasks (Taylor, 1911), therefore relegating the 
notions of management and organization to a mechanistic activity.  This view strongly 
influenced other organization theories, limiting the influence and scope of the managerial 
activity.  
For instance, the subject of organizational structures has been broadly covered and new 
conceptualizations have emerged based on the limitations of bureaucratic structures when 
dealing with innovation and change, such as, clans (Ouchi, 1980), adhocracies 
(Mintzberg, 1984) and fiefs (Boisot, 1986; Cameron & Quinn, 1999).  These new 
organizational forms have been explained in very different terms, focusing on an unclear 
division of labour and command.  However, this change in theories about organizational 
structure was not accompanied by a shift in the thinking about management forms which 
keep focusing on planning, coordinating, and controlling the production process.  
In this line of thought, an original approach to manage and foster novelty, innovation, and 
change is suggested, taking the theories of organization structure as a subject to evaluation 
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for two main gains: first, we give evidence of the deprived development of management 
forms present in the literature on organization structure and its consequences.  Second, 
we introduce a new managerial model which copes with innovation and its contingencies, 
such as uncertainty and the subjective reluctance of the individuals to the unknown.  Since 
traditional management forms are dealing with uncertainty through means of control, we 
argue that this juxtaposition is counterproductive in both directions; the realm of 
uncertainty is where novelty reigns and the realm of control is where efficiency and 
productivity are in focus.  In this model rhetoric is a new management function able to 
cope with uncertainty through means related with openness such as, interpretative 
flexibility.  We then suggest viewing organizations as a category of sub-structures, each 
going through a certain stage of development that may or may not be in agreement with 
others.  Such approach would enable a more dynamic view of the firm than the ones 
offered by organizational structure and traditional management forms.  In our view, 
management is relevant to the level of intelligibility of the subject to be managed. 
 
2.2. The Disengagement of Organizational Structures and Managerial Functions 
The literature on management forms is profoundly grounded in the concepts of 
controlling, planning, and coordinating the production activity whose basic idea and aim 
was the strict abolition of craft-dependent practices (Taylor, 1911) and freedom, in form 
of variance, in order to maximize productivity.  This premise is strictly related to the 
Industrial Revolution context which resulted in the raise of big corporations and mass-
production.  Within this context, management has been relegated to meet efficiency and 
maximize productivity.  In this part of the article, we claim that the development of 
organizational structures has grown consistently within this context, contributing very 
little to the management of novelty and innovation.  
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The topic of organizational structures has been extensively covered by studies of 
organizations, organizational change, strategic management and institutions.  For 
instance, a well-known alternative to functional and divisional organization is the matrix 
organization.  The triumph of the matrix organization relies in combining the strengths of 
its precursors.  It presents two axes, the vertical axis places the functional authority and 
the horizontal axis working teams assembled by particular projects or geographical areas, 
combining the functional and market dimensions (Galbraith, 1971; Davis & Lawrence, 
1977).  The matrix organization has been accompanied by an extensive amount of 
literature centred on who reports to whom but has brought few new challenges at the 
managerial level.  Ideas regarding total quality management and lean production as an 
alternative to traditional production methods, have introduced quality control and 
flexibility in the production process.  Still under the influence of traditional forms of 
management, the organization sharpens the control over the production process to obtain 
small volumes of an extended range of commodities, in order to reduce the cost of large 
inventories and meet customer preferences (Holweg, 2007).   
Other alternatives to former bureaucratic structures come from the governance and 
cultural approaches, which identify other types of organization structures, such as, clans 
(Ouchi, 1980), where the idea of control applies only in the presence of efficiency-related 
objectives (Ouchi, 1980; Boisot, 2011), adhocracies (Mintzberg, 1985) and fiefs (Boisot, 
1986; Cameron & Quinn, 1999), where an unclear division of labour, communication 
flows and authority were introduced.  These new organizational types are highly 
dependent on specialized teams and the emphasis is placed on the coordination function.  
Coordination is achieved through mutual collaboration and little formalization 
(Mintzberg, 1980).  
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The climax of the structural revolution came with the relational approach introducing the 
idea of a network organization, which described an organizational form that was seen as 
innovative (Powell, 1992).  The management functions of the network structure, as Burt 
(1992) describes, shifts from formal to informal control.  The network organization faces 
less clear directions and more uncertainty in coordination-related goals.  Successfully 
dealing with informal control would, for a manager, mean higher chances of promotion 
and greater financial rewards (Burt, 1992).  In the network organization, again 
management forms are not the primary topic of discussion.   
The new organizational structures attempt to put a stop to standard bureaucratic lines, in 
order to seize opportunities, solve problems and obtain results (Waterman, 1992).  Even 
non-bureaucratic templates still rely on traditional management functions like planning, 
coordinating and controlling.  But softening the sharp functional slope is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for facing innovation and change.  
 
2.3. Management Forms and the Absence of Control  
Innovation activities, as well as, scientific research, often involve managing very 
ambiguous problems which implicitly hold elevated levels of uncertainty.  Traditional 
forms of management based on strict control, concrete task breakdown, and a clear 
division of labour, require general level of certainty to be applied, and present many 
limitations in ambiguous and uncertain situations (Jensen, 2011; Nadal-Burgués & Bonet, 
2012). 
Based on this our claim is that uncertainty is only manageable in the absence of control.  
Following this claim we first introduce an enlarged conceptualization of management 
functions which copes with the two contrasting settings of the managerial activity, the 
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control approach to maximize productivity and the function related to innovation and 
change which often implies making decisions under very uncertain conditions.  And 
second, we discuss the implications of the paradox of dealing with uncertainty while 
managing under the influence of control-based approach. 
Rhetoric: a function to absorb managerial uncertainty  
Management literature takes the existing functions of rationally planning, coordinating 
and controlling as sufficient while change, value creation and innovation cannot be fully 
explained through them.  This path-dependent approach is looking at problems through 
certain models, analogies and concepts at the exclusion of others (Jensen, 2011).  The 
following lines present a fourth management function, which enlarges the management 
domain from the dominant tradition of clearness to the realm of ambiguity introducing 
the freedom or openness of interpretation due to a lack of clarity.  Managers often need 
to understand or face a particular situation that does not have a concrete model and 
certainly not a straight analogy to be applied; or where the present models do not work.  
This particular situation requires other means to be understood.  
One way to gradually disambiguate such situations is by means of ongoing interpretation, 
generating new symbols, and engaging in persuasion in order to eventually generate 
consensus.  Reaching consensus allows action, while lack of it could lead to divergent 
and/or conflicting actions.  However, it is possible that an acceptable result happens 
despite lack of consensus, but it would be a matter of chance and at a higher cost.  The 
above-mentioned attributes of creativity, i.e. ambiguity, interpretation, symbolism, and 
persuasion, belong to the realm of rhetoric and must be considered as a central function 
of management.  Mangers often need to make decisions where different meanings and 
interpretations arise, as in the example of Steve Jobs.  Considerably the epitome of 21st 
century manager, since the very beginning, Jobs is an example of managing through 
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means of persuasion, thus rhetoric.  We probably can all agree that it was his ability to 
persuade people that brought his visions to reality.  Jobs’ interpretation of consumer’s 
needs was at first unintelligible but to a few who would then help him shape the vision.  
As far as managerial activities go, this is certainly not without precedent. 
Henry Mintzberg (1973) in “The Nature of Managerial Work” already pointed that 
managers engage most of their time in conversations (Mintzberg, 1973).  Considering the 
evidence brought by Mintzberg we assert that managers’ main activity is to engage into 
conversations which create forms and spaces for interpretation, negotiation and 
persuasion (Jensen, 2011).  Moreover, the theory of management supports only a small 
percentage of its total activity.  Rhetoric or the art of the conversation is likely to widen 
the range of important managerial functions without dismissing the most recognized ones. 
The art of conversation, thus rhetoric, which according to the Classics refers to the “art 
of speaking well”2, could be incorporated as a new managerial function.  Several studies 
disclose the role of rhetoric in management sciences and offer a conceptual framework to 
understand how managers use language for achieving their aims but this approach does 
not only imply the logical and argumentative approach resulting in the acceptance of a 
theory but also a “good understanding of feelings, motivations, purposes and values” 
(Bonet & Sauquet, 2010:122) which would help to capture the particularities of a certain 
situation, recreate them symbolically and display them ready to be changed through a 
consensus.   
Moreover, managers are often entrenched in very ambiguous situations and “much of the 
effort in acting in such situations depends on the ability to interpret and to act and 
2  Gorgias a Socratic dialogue written by Plato 380 B.C. Gorgias is inquired by Socrates on the 
definition of rhetoric. 
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persuade others” (Jensen, 2011:54).  Borrowing terminology from the sociology of 
technical developments, we consider that technological developments encompass 
interpretive flexibility -which emerges when problems or findings are open to more than 
one interpretation, and closure -that occurs when a consensus on the issue at hand is 
reached (Pinch & Bijker, 1984).  Sociology of technical development focuses on the 
social and historical context influencing the innovation process and assessing the success 
and failure of models, theories, or experiments (Fleck, 1979; Collins, 1981, 1985; Pinch 
& Bijker, 1984; Latour, 1987).  The striking similarity between the stages of technical 
development and managing change and novelty, to us, lies in their inherent need to make 
decisions regarding what action to take in the face of incomplete information, ambiguity, 
and/or uncertainty.  
Depending on the type of problem or goal that needs to be addressed, rhetoric could 
function to absorb uncertainty.  The use of rhetorical means brings a variety of 
interpretations, that in turn, generate new options.  As consensus starts shaping through 
persuasion, the use of rhetorical means tends to narrow and eventually close the 
interpretive stage, and as a result, reduces the variety of options.  For instance, by 
introducing a new metaphor, one of the most well-known rhetorical devises, in a context, 
there is immediately a chance to invite the generation of new and varied interpretations.  
In this open stage “it is impossible to say which interpretation is the right one” (Jensen, 
2011: 51).  The unintelligibility of this moment puts the mechanisms of interpretation –
symbolism, freedom and judgment, to work in order to bring to the table more intelligible 
options.  For example, since long ago human kind desired to reach the moon.  This old 
and ambitious project has been subjected to many interpretations.  At the very beginning 
only poets could reach the moon.  Later, in the 16th century, Galileo was the first to see it 
with detail, and as other numerous scientific developments were introduced, finally, in 
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1969 Neil Alden Armstrong stepped on it and closed the moon project which lasted many 
centuries and got many different solutions.  The project has evolved per the interpretations 
given by the people pursuing it and in accordance with the available resources of their 
time.  
The fact that rhetorical means of persuasion open the variety of options for a problem to 
be solved and through consensus they decrease the assortment of interpretations that 
might rise during the time of openness, suggests that only a few of the options are fit to 
be pursued at any given time and that interpretative methods are suitable to disclose them.  
Once uncertainty is reduced and a few options are chosen, traditional management forms 
turn out to be more suitable.  In the absence of clarity, interpretative flexibility and 
openness turn into a new managerial function to cope with novelty, innovation and high 
uncertainty levels.  In this line of thought next section addresses different management 
forms in relation to different degrees of uncertainty an organization might face. 
Control and uncertainty 
The importance of the subject of innovation brought Management Control Systems 
literature to assert that accounting control systems are used in creative contexts as 
inspirational devices rather than as monitoring tools, obtaining both high efficiency and 
control while innovating (Davila & Ditillo, 20I11; Adler and Chen, 2011).  The following 
lines will discuss the implications of dealing with uncertainty and managing under the 
influence of control-based approach.  We believe that uncertainty cannot be managed 
through control-based approaches, since these approaches show a clear limitation when 
they implicitly suggest a path-dependency approach to solve a concrete problem (Boisot, 
1999).  The nature of a problem-solving approach does not imply Knightian3 uncertainty, 
3  Frank H. Knight (1921). Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. Knight explains the distinctive idea of uncertainty versus risk, in which uncertainty 
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often present in knowledge organizations, such as research and development laboratories.  
Their focus on complexity rather than uncertainty enables them to proceed under the basis 
of a control-based approach.  
In the governance approach, as in ours, the idea of control applies only in the presence of 
efficiency-related objectives (Ouchi, 1980; Boisot, 2011; Jensen, 2011; Nadal-Burgués 
& Bonet, 2012) based on goal and task clarity.  Following this line of thought we observe 
that sources of uncertainty, such as, growth, environmental volatility, scientific and 
technical developments, and changes in demand preferences or supply chain, claim 
“refashioning” of traditional management forms.  
Moreover, Alfred Chandler (1962) differentiates entrepreneurial and functional 
management.  Entrepreneurial action affects the allocation of resources for the enterprise 
while functional management deals with decisions about resources that are already 
allocated (Chandler, 1962).  Considering this, Chandler implicitly relied on the idea of 
uncertainty and complexity as different activities; the entrepreneurial manager is the one 
dealing with uncertainty, and providing a range of options from which some would be 
later on implemented by functional managers in charge of day to day operations and 
contingencies.  This new role implies the need for functions other than and beyond 
planning, controlling and coordinating everyday operations. 
Although entrepreneurial management in research and development organizations would 
provide a clearer and more straightforward pattern of how the rhetorical function of 
management is put to practice in order to deal with uncertainty, one must not omit the 
rhetoric function from the decision-making activities of a middle manager in charge of 
refers to situations where the possible categories of outcome are unknown, therefore no 
probability is assignable to them. 
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efficiency related tasks.  For instance, a restaurant manager might have to go through an 
argument with the staff, over how to clean the dishes, which is a simple and mechanical 
task for the staff to perform, not exactly by the standardized form, but to the same effect.  
By focusing on the avoidance of craft, variety, and possibility to engage in freedom 
through interpretive flexibility, the manager loses resources that could be invested in 
something more relevant to the final outcome.  
The entrepreneurial activity could be considered a task close to providing options to 
tackle uncertainty.  Shannon and Weaver (1949) in “The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication” when discussing the nature of information under certainty and 
uncertainty, and using the probability theory, argue that freedom of choice is higher in 
the presence of more information.  The conditions of higher freedom and more 
information appropriately address higher degrees of uncertainty, i.e. higher entropy.  
Shannon and Weaver tacitly imply the unwillingness of using control-based approaches 
when uncertainty is high.  Considering this we affirm that control-based approaches are 
not closely relevant to situations with high uncertainty, thus, they do not appropriately 
deal with innovation and novelty.  Novelty contains some degrees of uncertainty and 
ambiguity resulting from additional information (March & Simon, 1958).  In pursuing 
novelty, the degree of uncertainty can be very high and absorbing it would demand other 
management forms which can cope with the absence of control.  
 
 
2.4. Stages of Development: A New Approach to Managing Organizations 
Organizations deal with both novelty, to foster innovation and, at the same time, stability 
or order to exploit their current competitive advantages (Schumpeter, 1934; March and 
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Simon, 1958; Porter, 1980).  This subject has been widely developed in ambidexterity 
literature (Birkinshaw, 2008; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Raisch et al., 2009).  They 
broadly suggest that ambidextrous organizations create and use structural mechanisms 
that enable higher performance.  However, the focus on the perfect balance of the dual 
structure while emphasizing on efficiency and productivity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) 
does not consider a new management form able to cope with the structural differences.  
This raises the paradox in which the same functions of planning, coordination, and control 
are used to deal with both exploration and exploitation (March, 1991).   
This part of the paper develops a managerial model based on the notion of stages of 
development which considers different degrees of uncertainty.  Open stages of 
development bring in the possibility to face uncertainty introducing rhetoric as a new 
managerial function.  This, permits categorizing organizational objectives in two stages. 
In closed stages of development goals are under clarity and objectivity, therefore 
uncertainty is very low and traditional forms of management are suitable.  However, not 
all organizational goals can be placed in this category, since goals’ specification is 
sometimes not evident, causing the traditional management forms to face many 
limitations and to lose viability over time due to their rigidity and often inflexibility.  In 
contrast, in open stage of development, elevated levels of uncertainty are faced in the 
absence of pure rationality and objectiveness, rhetorical openness invites managers to 
reflect, observe and make interpretations. 
According to the previous section we state that managers engage in periods of rhetorical 
openness to deal with uncertainty, eventually leading to a consensus that would mark the 
entrance into the stage of rhetorical closure.  The notion of stages of development does 
not focus on the process but on the degree of uncertainty of the proposed goal to 
acknowledge what form of management is required at each stage.  Figure 1 suggests that 
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different degrees of uncertainty would require different management forms.  It enables a 
shift of focus that would let us consider context, work activity and goal as the focal point 
to determine the appropriate management form.  
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Figure 1: Management forms in relation to the degree of uncertainty 
 
Summarizing, the bottom left quadrant represents closure stages of development under 
conditions of low uncertainty.  Under such circumstances, control-based management 
forms seem most proper; whenever organizational structures and the traditional forms of 
management are suitable because a clear work-flow can be envisioned, it is feasible to 
breakdown the work in simple tasks and responsibilities can be accurately assigned.  
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The top right quadrant, the open stages of development are presented under conditions of 
high uncertainty.  In this case, traditional forms of management are inappropriate because 
reduced clarity of the work-flow and difficulty to breakdown the work in simple tasks 
makes it impossible to rationally assign responsibilities.  Therefore, strict control, 
planning and coordination are futile, since the building blocks for planning, controlling, 
and coordinating tasks are not readily available in the first place.  
The top left and bottom right quadrants show the discordance between context and 
managerial forms, representing the paradox between the types of goal or task 
accomplishment and the management form used to achieve it.  Therefore, managing 
through methods relying on strict control and coordination when subjected to high levels 
of uncertainty would possibly prove to be counterproductive.  As well, in a clear setting, 
when the goal, the scope (planned cost and resources) and timing can be specified, 
managing through interpretative flexibility would lead to certain inefficiencies.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
The rhetorical turn of managerial functions not only enlarges the functions of 
management but also gives meaning to the literature on organizational structure.  Through 
rhetoric, managers shape and change the symbols and meanings of the present status of 
time and get into something new.  Therefore, in addition to the functions of controlling, 
planning and coordinating by the means of rationality, deliberate engagement in rhetoric 
is another managerial function to consider dealing with uncertainty in the most useful 
way.  Traditional management forms do not appropriately deal with uncertain and 
ambiguous situations that are common in the context of research and innovative 
organizations.  So far, control has been viewed as a fundamental aspect of management, 
limiting the range and application of management forms under uncertainty.  
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Our model represents this enlarged view of the managed firm by considering diverse 
types of goals and tasks which will require different forms of management depending on 
how uncertain the goal or tasks are.  The traditional approach to management is neither 
covering the entire scope of the managerial activity nor is offering the means to deal with 
uncertainty.  We show that dealing with uncertainty using traditional management forms 
can lead to counterproductive outcomes.  Uncertainty is absorbed through interpreting 
the situation, giving meanings and using persuasive arguments to reach a consensus for 
action; this new managerial approach has been introduced in our study as rhetorical and 
it complements the rational methods which we find suitable when dealing with concrete 
and specified tasks and goals.  We suggest that rhetoric is a crucial managerial function 
that better infers in what managers do to solve the wide variety of problems that they are 
facing when approaching novelty.  It is true that once the problems acquire a more 
determined form, the rational approach can serve better to the purpose of managing and 
to deal with the unpredictability of economic cycles, the wide variety of organizational 
goals, and the incessant search for something new. 
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Purpose: This article aims to advance our understanding of the importance and function 
of narratives in the context of organizational change.    
Methodology: Drawing on Schutz’s theory of human intentional action, I introduce the 
concept of a mental project – broadly referring to the mental rehearsal of a future act – 
and build a conceptual framework that connects mental projects to narratives.  Viewing 
actions through the lens of mental projects and narratives would prompt a combination 
of rigid clarity and flexible vagueness in both the action and the stories.  Considering this, 
I developed a longitudinal case study on organizational change in an international 
company amid an intense renewal process.  Several narratives about the project of 
organizational change were studied, and these revealed some of the functions that 
narratives serve as well as their importance in connecting plans of human action with the 
actual execution of those actions.  This article identifies numerous distinct narratives, 
4 This article has been published in the Journal of Organizational Change Management, Vol. 30 
Issue: 3, doi: 10.1108/JOCM-10-2016-0201 
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created by different actors, which focus on the process of setting and reaching a final 
goal.  The content of these narratives reveals how different views and strategies co-exist 
simultaneously in the organization, even when actors are trying to achieve the same goal.  
Findings: Traditionally, management takes an analytical approach to understand how 
change occurs in organizations.  This paper emphasizes the importance and functions of 
narratives as a fundamental component of organizational change.  On par with the linear 
plan of action, it is argued that the assortment of narratives delivered from various points 
of views in the organization are, indeed, the driver of change, and their dynamic 
interaction would determine the outcome of a change project. 
Value: Understanding the role of narratives in organizational change.  This article 
emphasizes the difficulties of using an analytical approach as a basis for understanding 
how action is implemented.  This difficulty arises because of the variety of interpretations 
and meanings given to the project purpose and goal, and how these interpretations and 
meanings influence people’s future actions or project success. 
 
3.2. Introduction 
The idea of strategic planning as a way of programming future organizational action is 
commonly questioned as a reasonable premise for understanding organizational change 
(Mintzberg, 1994).  Because plans are incomplete and conditions change in unforeseen 
ways, the goals that are set at the beginning of a change process are rarely realized as 
intended (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Mintzberg, 1994).  For this reason, unforeseen 
events are more likely to conspire against goals that are precise and easy to verify.  A 
reasonable response would therefore be to formulate more vague goals, so that the 
vagueness in goals matches the uncertainty in outcomes.  
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In line with this characterization of strategic planning, the promise of the analytical 
approach to organizational change in economics and management studies is usually 
broken when confronted with the actual processes of planning and executing 
organizational change projects (Mintzberg, 1994).  From the perspective of employees 
and managers, promises are broken, again and again.  How then can managers trust 
strategic planners who promise that the outcome of a change process will meet a clearly 
specified ambitious goal?  They cannot and probably do not.  
It is here proposed that managers would rather embrace promising narratives than trust 
clearly defined ambitious goals.  In line with Mintzberg’s (1994) claim that managers 
should make their contribution around the strategy making process, the idea is that mental 
projects take the form of narratives that managers can believe in.  In other words, it is 
conceivable that mental projects can be formulated as narratives that managers view as 
credible promises even though the specifics remain vague.  Narratives that can somehow 
serve as credible promises about outcomes of change processes thus connect planned 
actions with uncertain outcomes.   
Drawing on Schutz’s (1953) theory of human intentional action, I pursue this idea by 
introducing the concept of a mental project – broadly referring to the mental rehearsal of 
a future act – and building a conceptual framework that connects mental projects to 
narratives.  Through a longitudinal case study in an international company going through 
acquisition by a much bigger conglomerate, this article examines the narratives of 17 
managers exposed to radical organizational change.  Comparing the actions of these 
managers with their different narratives as the events unfold, provides an intriguing 
ground to study the role of narratives as generators of change.  These stories give a better 
understanding of the importance and the function of narratives in organizations, 
concretely in a project of organizational change.  
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Perhaps the most interesting contribution of this paper, is viewing freedom to formulate 
future plans as an irreplaceable factor in organizations, as the individuals will strive for it 
in one way or another.  From the narratives obtained for this study, it is clear that in 
situations where the desired final outcome or goal is clearly defined, managers practice 
their freedom in creating various narratives that change from one point in time to the 
other, while keeping the final goal as fixed.  On the other hand, if the procedures to reach 
a certain goal are communicated as the most important priority to the managers, they will 
then exercise their want for freedom to create numerous goals to fit those fixed 
procedures. 
More generally, this paper contributes to relate the theory of narratives with the concept 
of human intentional action developed by Alfred Schutz (1953).  By pairing Schutz’s 
theory of human intentional action with the theory and use of narratives in organizations, 
it is argued that an intentional action has the structure of a narrative.  This connection is 
important to contribute to the development of the theory of narratives.  
Viewing actions as narratives would require considering the plan of an action, and how it 
unfolds in relation to the purpose of the aforementioned action.  Understanding change 
from the perspective of those who plan it and those who have to go through it, and 
differentiating between the two, brings a number of interpretations and meanings to the 
project of organizational change that was neither foreseen, nor taken into account when 
the project was designed.  
 
3.3. The Use and Functions of Narratives  
By juxtaposing “decisions” and “happen”, James March (1991), emphasized in “How 
decisions happen in organizations” that there are other aspects that guides us to an 
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alternative approach to management than that of rational-man perspective and physics.  
The importance and functions of narratives and stories in organizational change literature 
is rare but prominent.  Deirdre McCloskey (1985) claims that even the history of economy, 
with its statistical data and methodological constraints, is, in fact, a collection of 
narratives.  It is not the mere presence of narratives that is seen as an impressive part of 
an organization, but also their effects through interpretations.  For instance, Weick’s 
(1979, 1995) contribution on sense-making refers to narratives in organizations and their 
importance in driving and directing change.  Furthermore, in “Translating Organizational 
Change” (1996), Czarniawska and Sevón suggest that narratives in organizations reveal 
the answers to questions about the identity and goal of individuals, which are of critical 
importance when it comes to change.  More closely on this topic, Pentland (1999) asserts 
that narratives are the raw material for change, as they are not just told but also enacted 
in organizations.   
The structure of Narratives 
Since our communication skills can be highly developed, they permit us to explain very 
complex phenomena, such a scientific discovery, or to make sense of our lived 
experiences (Hawkins & Saleem, 2012).  Narratives and stories, as told by many and 
heard and interpreted by many, are not only used as communication means and literary 
material, they are also excellent drivers of organizational change for managers (Flory & 
Iglesias, 2010).  Even though there is a bit of disagreement among scholars on whether 
stories and narratives mean the same (Czarniawska, 1997; Boje, 1991; Gabriel, 2000) the 
similarities are overwhelming.  Flory and Iglesias (2010) further expand the definition of 
narratives when they claim that a narrative “[...] is the reflective product of looking back 
and making sense of stories constructed to make sense of life”.  In all instances, one could 
safely allow for a narrative to contain three main elements: a plot, that is the sequence of 
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events and their chronological order, a theme, that is the overarching meaning or morale 
of the story, and the setting, which is the context in which the events take place.  The 
structure of intentional human action, as elaborated by Schutz (1953) is comparable to 
the structure of narratives in that it includes a sequence for the unfolding of events, which 
he calls the mental project, and an overarching meaning, which is the purpose of the 
action.  
 
3.4. Intentional Action and the Project of change 
 In many projects, and concretely in a project of change in organizations, perfect 
information is scarce, making the sole use of analytical tools insufficient to understand 
and manage change.  Though we usually consider management of a project of change in 
an organization to result from rational reflections and scientific analysis, the projects’ 
design, the decisions it implicates, its execution, and the activities involved during their 
implementation, go beyond this conceptualization (Nadal-Burgués, 2014, 2015).  Based 
on this, Nuria Nadal-Burgués’ (2014) introduces elements of change previously 
disregarded: a more flexible notion of project than the one used in Project Management 
literature.  This extended notion of project involves interpretation and meanings and 
“expands the rational, generic and technical notion of project management” (Nadal-
Burgués & Bonet, 2016). 
In “Common-sense and scientific interpretation of human action”, Alfred Schutz (1953) 
introduces the phenomenological foundations of social science.  For Schutz, an action is 
composed by three elements: a purpose, a mental project - which consists of a mental 
rehearsal of the future act, and the performance of the act.  An action presupposes that 
one’s experience throughout their life provides them with knowledge (knowledge at hand) 
and a horizon of possible purposes, from which they choose a purpose at hand.  This 
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purpose is to transform an initial state of affairs into a future state.  One usually perceives 
repetitive actions as identical; however, while many of these repetitions are quite like 
each other regarding their ultimate goal and method of execution, upon closer 
examination, there are almost always some minute variations.  Basic tasks, such as going 
to work, catching the bus or reading the morning paper fall into this category.  
For Schutz, a repeated action is, in effect, a new action which is happened to be considered 
as similar to a previous action, hence identified with it.  This perspective allows us to 
scrutinize each individual action, be it a routine or a creative one from the basis of its 
inherent narrative, or as Schutz called it, the mental project.  
Intentional action and narratives 
According to Schutz, a mental project can range from very vague to very precise.  It can 
be seen as a kind of hypothesis that would eventually be corroborated or falsified.  This 
final property, that is, the possibility to corroborate or falsify the hypothesis of an act, 
comes from comparing the initial purpose to the outcome.  
The purpose of an act corresponds with the theme of a narrative: the morale of the story, 
the point that it is trying to make.  Even though, quite like the outcome, the actual purpose 
of any act is negotiable and difficult to single out, there must be a purpose to ignite the 
process of an action.  The purpose and the outcome are both open to interpretation, the 
first only to the actor, and the later, both to the actor and the audience of the act. 
An action and a narrative have some meaning to the actor or the narrator and, most likely, 
other meanings to observers.  Interpretation is necessary both at the real time, and in 
retrospect.  The actor would have to form interpretations on the go, while s/he evaluates 
the context and takes every step of the project.  Once the act is completed, the actor might 
see that the outcome is more or less what s/he was expecting.  It could also be the case 
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that the outcome turns out to be far from expectation, even giving the opposite effect.  
Even though every act is a desire for a change in the state of the world from time 1 to 
time 2, in case of organizational change, the evolution in the state of affairs is assumed 
to be more prominent.  The outcome is supposed to be seen not only by the actor but also 
by the observers/audience as a change in the state of affairs.  
The actor and the audience would have their own contextual narratives to interpret the 
outcome and suggest what the primary purpose must have been.  Under such 
circumstances, organization scientists and organization actors alike, thrive to find a 
logical argument that would help them sieve through all the existing explanations and 
find those that could help them foresee and solve future problems when it comes to 
planning, implementing, and concluding change.  
 
3.5. Case Study 
The longitudinal case study is on a Japanese MNE, which I call A-Med in this paper.5 A-
Med was chosen because it was right at the beginning of the introduction of an 
international change program from the HQ that would have dire consequences for the 
operating branches.  Due to its size and its problematic management, there was a lot of 
confusion and chaos going on, which made it an intriguing case with high probabilities 
of failure.  Furthermore, the almost complete access to managers and their meetings, be 
it on a large scale or a one on one scale, made it an ideal case to study narratives and the 
use of them in a change situation.  
5 The case study of A-Med was conducted by the author in the period of 2011-13 (see more 
detailed description in introduction).  
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Studying a multinational company for over two years opens interesting challenges to 
understanding the purpose and process of change.  Through a qualitative case study of A-
Med, access to top level management of the Europe, Middle East, Africa (EMEA) was 
attained, enabling multiple open interviews with same participants, observing them in 
meetings, and in day-to-day situations.  The narratives by the participants and the 
observations where then used as basic data, along with in-house journals and 
correspondence within the company.  
Juxtaposing the narratives of the actors in the change process at each step and comparing 
them through time reveals that a success story at each and every phase is the constant, 
and it is the recollection of the primary goals of change that vary in retrospect at every 
narration.  It seems that the goals do not simply evolve through time, but they are framed 
differently according to the final outcome at every stage.  Through an investigation into 
the acts, the outcomes, and the narratives of the actors, I hope to gain a better 
understanding of how change occurs and what makes it succeed, in one way or another.  
It shows the relationship between the official stories of the company and the ways they 
are interpreted, as well as the stories and images produced and interpreted by HQ 
managers and their EMEA counterparts.  This study will focus on the divergent stories 
and interpretations which are based on diverse cultures and views of the business.  
Based on top management's 2011 internal survey, the main challenges facing A-Med were 
related to two basic areas: profitability and identity.  The first area captures the financial 
performance, and ultimately survival; whereas the second area points to a company-wide 
need to be recognized and discernible in the eyes of the end costumers and other 
stakeholders.  The internal survey suggests that the brand and the overarching integrity 
of the company's identity is neither known to their employees nor their clients.  Examples 
vary from confusion about the font and colour of the logo to the values and vision of the 
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company.  These were mentioned as some of the most important reasons for 
organizational change. 
A-Med was established in 1930s, with headquarters in Tokyo, and specialized in 
manufacturing and sales of healthcare and life-care products.  It has branches in the 
Americas, Europe, Middle East, Africa, and Asia-Pacific, with more than 20,000 
employees worldwide.  Here, we are looking at the firm’s EMEA subsidiary.  It is owned 
solely by Japanese citizens with a strong and perhaps over-emphasized focus on detailed 
information regarding financial activities, formal communication through budget and 
expenditure forms, and informal communication through their 'representatives' in almost 
every area of operation.  In contrast, top management of the EMEA subsidiary is an 
international team, consisting of people who are mostly educated – and with prior 
professional experience – in the US.  All EMEA's top managers are younger in age, and 
the gender balance is not as skewed as is in the group of owners.  The EMEA top 
managers jointly cover a rather broad area of focus, which is tailored to the country they 
are working in; for example, strong R&D-focus in Japan, Legal requirements in the UK, 
Services in Germany, Sales in France, Cost reduction in Italy, etc. 
In the paragraphs below, I briefly explain the main problems observed during the two-
year study of A-Med's EMEA subsidiary.  An interesting observation is that even though 
problems such as tensions relating to structure, attitude, and communication are 
persistent, the EMEA subsidiary actually performed successfully at the time our case 
study ended (as assessed by Japanese HQ).  Despite the success of EMEA, our case study 
revealed several problems, which are here grouped under three main categories – cultural 
differences, unclear communication, R&D and market orientation – that emerged during 
the course of the case study.  To relate to these points, one must remember that this paper’s 
angle is the narratives and the variety of them.  
 46 
    
Narrative Types 
As elaborated below, there are two distinct types of narratives: the ones by the 
headquarters, which emphasize the final goals, while leaving the means to reach the goals 
in some vagueness.  That is, reducing the variety of interpretations regarding what the 
goal is, and opening up the number of interpretations of how to reach it.  The HQ has 
clear ideas about the direction that the company must head towards, but knows little about 
the situational details in each branch.  On the other hand, since the means to reach those 
goals are more contextualized at the EMEA level, the managers at EMEA tend to focus 
on how they are going to achieve the goals, as, due to their location, they know a lot more 
about the context they are situated in than the HQ.  Here is an excerpt from two interviews 
to illustrate the point above.  The first interviewee is at HQ and the second is the head of 
UK branch: 
Interviewer: “…what have you achieved in the past month and what do you have in store 
for the future?” 
Interviewee1: “…there is a lot more to do… we [HQ] hope that they [EMEA] see our 
points.  They think that we are being tough on them because we ask for detailed records, 
but to us, it is a way to learn about their activities, challenges, etc.  But still, we are doing 
well.  Last month the whole company reduced the difference between budget and 
expenditure from 23% to 18%.  This is an immense success.  I think they [EMEA] could 
follow the procedures we asked for.  With success like this, I think they will start seeing 
that our way is proven and reliable […] Our plans for the next three months is to further 
reduce the difference [between budget and expenditure] to 15%.  […] One specific plan 
for the coming month is to increase the volume of our contracts by 10%.  We asked 
EMEA to do this by integrating sales and services.  It is a project that is new, but will 
eventually become the norm…” 
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Interviewer: “…what have you achieved in the past month and what do you have in store 
for the future?” 
Interviewee 2: “…we [UK branch]’ve been very busy… since last time, we are still trying 
to reach the hospital directors who are not placing their colonoscopy and endoscopy 
orders with us.  It is of course important to reach individual practitioners, but our 
competition is obtaining much bigger sales through selling to hospitals.  Those guys make 
massively bigger orders, they are returning costumers, and they spend a lot on repairs and 
maintenance.  […]  The Japanese fellows don’t even care to listen to this.  It’s just budget 
reports with them… Every month!  I mean, what other company asks for budgets this 
often?  It is bloody ridiculous… […] It is impossible to sit in your office in Tokyo and 
order me in London to tell my clients that this is all we have and we do not even know 
what the new products are going to be… […] we did manage to reduce the difference 
[between budget and expenditure] by 5%, which is an interesting story by itself.  […] I 
sent my team on a training course in Budapest, but didn’t record it in this month’s 
expenditure.  Instead, it will show in next month’s… We are merging our offices next 
month, which means a significant reduction in costs, which will offset the training 
spending… […] The Japanese want numbers, we give them numbers…” 
These excerpts reflect the characteristics of the two kinds of narratives found in this 
research.  The narratives produced by the HQ and told to subsidiaries focus exclusively 
on economical achievement explained in the form of financial objectivity.  They do not 
inform of the state of new product research and development, do not refer to, or reinforce 
the identity of the MNE, and do not show interest in the strategic conditions of the 
subsidiaries.  EMEA, on the other hand, has produced narratives that are anchored on 
their strategies regarding the financial goal set by HQ.  The desire to feel successful is 
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deeply rooted in this case, as even in instances that EMEA fails to reach the goal set by 
HQ, their narrative is modified to reflect on a success in another aspect or direction.  
 
3.6. The Main Issues 
Cultural differences.  The main cause for tension mentioned by the managers and 
employees is 'cultural' difference; the longer the employees have been with the company, 
the more they feel unappreciated by the recently hired team.  The family-like culture of 
the Japanese organization makes a vivid contrast to the success and achievement oriented 
culture of the U.S educated managers in the subsidiary.  Furthermore, since people are 
coming from a variety of geographical locations, they tend to attribute the majority of 
problems to their cultural differences.  These differences are manifested in many ways.  
For instance, there is loss of trust because of random-looking procedures of praise and 
promotion, threatening work environment because of language related provocations, and 
break down of communication. 
While the Japanese HQ has a clear and rather rigid approach to structuring the 
organization, the same level of structural rigidity does not apply to the EMEA subsidiary.  
From the interviews with managers who have been with the company for more than 10 
years, it seems that the latest managerial changes, i.e. bringing in the recently hired top 
management team, has left the EMEA subsidiary in a complex situation, with a dramatic 
increase in the number of decisions that must be made.  On one hand, there is a noticeable 
clash between the more formal and hierarchical structure in the HQ, and the less formal 
structure in EMEA.  On the other hand, the information about the structure is not clearly 
or formally communicated from HQ to EMEA.  
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Finally, there is a big debate in the HQ as well as EMEA about the size and structure of 
the entire organization, with one camp advocating for a big and strong organization and 
the other campaigning for a small and agile one.  The topic of this debate obviously 
reflects a critically important disagreement regarding the firm’s organizational structure.  
Based on statements from EMEA management and HQ members, there is a clear gap 
between what the two sides perceive as their goals; on the EMEA side, the emphasis is 
on adaptability to the environment, high independence, and achieving short term goals.  
On the HQ side, it is all the opposite: emphasis on efficiency, hierarchy, and long-term 
goals.  
Unclear communication.  As for communication, it is not just the common daily 
conversations that seem to suffer from the above-mentioned cultural problems.  On a 
higher level, it is observed that when it comes to general understanding of the brand, the 
vision and mission, as well as the main values and goals of the organization, there are 
neither clear channels of communication, nor clear attempts to build one.  Even though 
in theory there are designed communication channels, in practice they are not used, either 
because they are not taken seriously, or because they are, in fact, not functional.  It appears 
that smaller sub-groups have been formed in the organization – either based on functional 
or personal acquaintance – that exchange information about issues and updates, while 
leaving the rest of the organization in the dark.  A common complaint is that many of the 
employees, especially those without the network of professional and personal connections, 
have to learn about the new strategies, changes, and decisions, through the international 
media, which, understandably, creates dissatisfaction and mistrust.  In addition to that, 
more common problems that are main consequences of poor communication arise in the 
organization, such as lack of knowledge sharing regarding best practices, innovative ideas, 
and general guidelines on problem solutions. 
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When all is said and done, it could be argued that the underlying demotivating factor for 
the individual managers is the misalignment of expectations and demands on various 
levels.  On one hand, people do not know exactly what they are supposed to deliver to 
their regional managers, and on the other, they are not committed to the better known 
more general HQ expectations either, since, to them, there is no obvious link between 
reward and positive (or constructive) behaviour.  The 'orders' that come from HQ are seen 
as unrealistic and fussy, while the more local strategies are criticized as being too tough 
and one sided.  Responding to that criticism, Japanese HQ claims that the 'orders' are 
mere suggestions and they are actually looking for feedback from the EMEA managers 
via comparing actual outcomes with documents on forecasts for future profit and 
expenditure.  However, on the other side of the story, EMEA managers claim that their 
voice is not heard at HQ, and they are mostly burdened by HQ's rather pointless demands 
and orders.   
R&D and market orientation.  One of the main complaints of EMEA managers relates to 
their inability to respond to their local markets and clients.  They, rightly, claim that since 
they are in direct contact with the end users/buyers and the environment in which they 
have to perform, they are the best people to have a say on what R&D needs to focus on.  
This proves to be a major problem, since the R&D labs are exclusively at the HQ and are 
ran independently by the Japanese HQ.  Furthermore, since there are no direct lines of 
communication between the EMEA team and R&D, even in instances where R&D's 
projects are in fact aligned with the needs of EMEA markets, the mutual ignorance of 
these facts becomes counterproductive.  This issue seems to be one where the top 
managers of the EMEA subsidiary do not have any hope of improvement in sight.  
In summary, several observations could be distilled.  First, it should be mentioned that 
the EMEA subsidiary ended as the highest performing subsidiary in the MNE despite the 
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obvious issues, complaints, and the chaotic nature of communications between EMEA 
and HQ.  At the end of this study, the EMEA subsidiary managed to outperform all other 
subsidiaries, and received various rewards from the Japanese HQ.  It is therefore 
interesting to gauge the elements of narratives that contributed to that outcome.  
EMEA's communication with the Japanese HQ favoured a combination of ambiguity 
regarding process control while admitting rigid control and commitment on observable 
financial outcomes.  EMEA kept HQ content by delivering financial reports exactly the 
way the HQ wanted, meanwhile challenging them regarding procedure to gain more 
autonomy.  EMEA created (some) ambiguity on process by delaying reports to HQ for a 
while – for example, EMEA would delay information on spending on equipment, or 
customer satisfaction, but would then usually compensate that with a bigger contract, or 
more sales.  
Another way EMEA would create ambiguity was to talk about overcoming 'the challenge' 
while the specifications and attributes of 'the challenge' would keep on changing 
throughout time (culture, communication, R&D, sales, integration, etc.) It appears that 
the balance between local autonomy for EMEA and the rigid structure HQ imposed is 
gained through an interesting communication strategy that put a premium on local 
autonomy regarding daily operations.  That is, EMEA would consistently communicate 
a solid image of their goals and operations to HQ (firmly committing to agreed final 
objective of profitability), while taking advantage of any communication blind spot or 
loopholes to get some space to explore the possible advantages of autonomy.  In that 
regard, the relation between EMEA and HQ seems to mimic a market like construction 
with fairly high-powered incentives.  Following a similar logic, also EMEA's 
management style offered lots of autonomy to its lower level managers, but no excuses 
were accepted for not delivering as agreed – the result would mean everything.   
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The constant change of the ultimate objective of the organization from the perspectives 
of EMEA managers seems to be a fairly interesting observation in this case study.  There 
would be no admission of failure, even though many of the earlier goals were never 
achieved, not even approached.  Instead, the modifications of the goals keep the 
individuals going for a while, treating them as winners, and giving them more 
opportunities to explore and benefit from structural loopholes provided by loose process 
control.   
 
3.7. Discussion 
There are numerous distinct narratives, created by different actors, which focus on the 
process of setting and reaching a final goal.  The content of these narratives reveal how 
different views and strategies co-exist simultaneously in the organization, even when 
actors are trying to achieve the same goal.  From the narratives obtained for this study, it 
is distinct that a combination of freedom to create alternative stories and the responsibility 
to uphold a set of clear and rigid requirements, are the basic building blocks of each 
narrative.  In situations where the desired final goal is clearly defined, managers practice 
their freedom in creating various narratives that change from one point in time to the 
other, while keeping the final goal as fixed.  On the other hand, if the procedures to reach 
a certain goal are communicated as the most important priority to the managers, they will 
then exercise their need for freedom to create numerous goals to fit those fixed 
procedures.  
There are subtle changes from one story to another; as the author repeated the interviews 
with the EMEA managers, it became clear that if there is one constant in the stories told 
from the beginning to the end of the study, it has to be the narrative of success in change 
situation.  Time after time the interviewees gave different plans of action for the future, 
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which happened to be falsified by their actual performance.  However, they managed to 
stick to the initial purpose: success.  As mentioned in the previous section, since A-Med 
was threatened by disintegration, the survival of any and, perhaps, all EMEA managers 
depended on their reported success.  One might argue that this apparent success could 
have been merely the interpretation of HQ, but since the reporting means were rigid, clear, 
and almost inflexible, such conclusion is not backed up by evidence from the case.  The 
most probable explanation comes from dissecting the narratives of the managers and 
comparing them to Schutz’ theory of intentional action.  Not only was the purpose fluid 
and vague enough to be transformed from one situation to another, it was also firmly 
grounded on succeeding on the terms required by the Japanese HQ.  The mental projects 
for each of these actions were indeed based on the knowledge at hand, which the 
managers would have from their previous experiences and challenges, however, since 
some of the situations they were facing were outside their “knowledge at hand” zone, 
they had to improvise, assuming the closest possibility to what they had faced before.  
This creativity, vagueness in plan, and uncertainty, would allow them to regroup and 
revise the mental projects of action while keeping the same purpose.  As the creators of 
their narratives as mental projects, quite like any other author, EMEA managers hold the 
purpose of the act(s) as the glue to keep the story together, and the turbulences in plot 
deem manageable as long as there is a unifying theme that is not in conflict with the 
parallel themes of other stories, that is, those of the fellow managers. 
 
3.8. Closing and Implications 
The project of change in an organization has been viewed from diverse angles.  Through 
the longitudinal case study of an international firm at the time of change, the author has 
observed and recorded the narratives of the managers regarding how they handle the 
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uncertain and risky situation of change and emerge prosperous.  The closest theoretical 
lens to the observed phenomenon comes from Alfred Schutz’ theory of intentional action, 
in which an action is comprised of a purpose, a mental project, and the execution of the 
act.  The focus of this case study has been mainly on the first two elements, that is, the 
purpose and the mental project.  By comparing the narratives of the managers to the 
purpose and plans for their action, one can clearly see that an actor devising an action 
resembles an author writing a story.  This statement contributes to our understanding of 
the complex topic of decision making and change, allowing us to control and manipulate 
the events in the process of change to our advantage.  In addition to the obvious rhetoric 
of change, viewing actions as narratives would prompt a combination of rigid clarity and 
flexible vagueness in stories and action plans.  For example, depending on the goal of the 
change, one could emphasise either on the purpose of an action or the processes leading 
to the final goal; the first will be more likely under an improvise-able action plan, 
allowing the “author” to take liberties with the sequence of the plot, and the second would 
allow the “author” to build up the purpose or the morale of the story once s/he gets hold 
of enough information about the required plot.  It is important for practitioners and 
scholars to recognise the need for allowing enough vagueness in the change goals or in 
the processes, as keeping both rigid would not be a reasonable option.  The contextual 
demands and uncertainties of change would require the actor to make decisions, in one 
form or another.  Handing down a detailed point by point plan of change where nothing 
is negotiable would not ease the project of change, as individuals would have to 
compromise either the process or the final goal, in order to cope with the demands of their 
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The Tale of Two Cases: Expanding the 








The rise of Asia and globalization in general has advanced our understanding of how 
businesses can adapt to the changing competitive conditions, and how they can adjust 
their strategy, marketing, governance, and other business functions.  Business practices 
have, perhaps not surprisingly, adapted faster than business scholars to the changes in 
competition, signifying a need for the internationalization of internationalization theory 
itself.  We suggest that a behavioural approach is a fruitful framework as it can easily 
accommodate several elements important to Asian practices.  Based on case study of a 
Japanese and a Chinese MNE, we can distil a few insights that jointly contribute to 
expanding the behavioural approach to account for internationalization processes in 
Asian firms.  We view internationalization is essentially an adaptive process 
characterized by prominent challenges associated with differences in institutional and 
cultural practices, and provide a new way of thinking of such processes.  The 
internationalization process is a path dependent process where the actual paths that can 
be taken are influenced by a mixture of random events and firm strategic decision making 
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and policies.  Our case studies highlight many of such mechanisms relating to psychic 
distance, organizational design, and control of international expansion.   
 
4.2. Introduction 
“…international business research has succeeded because it has focused on … a number 
of big questions which arise from empirical developments in the world economy.  The 
agenda is stalled because no such big question has currently been identified.  … Without 
a close interaction between theoretical development and empirical reality, international 
business could become a merely an area of application for applied concepts from other 
disciplines” (Buckley, 2002, p. 370). 
Globalization in all of its aspects, the rise of Asia, and the changes in the global business 
landscape, post challenges, puzzles, and paradoxes, not only for global economies and 
businesses, but also for theories that aim to advance our understanding of business 
practices as they become international.  Firms have to constantly adapt and adjust to new, 
different and changing political, economic, social, technological, legal, and 
environmental issues6, and are, at the same time, shaped by fundamental cultural and 
psychological aspects of the societies in which they are located. 7  For example, an 
organization in the west expanding internationally into Chinese markets cannot rely on 
simply continuing its western ways of doing business, but must carefully consider the 
6 That is, all the challenges in the firm’s external environment that are identified in the 
commonly used PESTEL framework.  In addition to these, we also believe there is a case for 
pointing to changes in the firm’s internal conditions, e.g. related to various organizational 
changes.   
7 Crozier’s book (1967) indicated how bureaucracies are influenced by their culture and how 
differences in bureaucracies in nations (French vs Russian and American) can be explained at 
least in part by reference to their cultural elements and hierarchical styles – an insight that 
should apply nicely to the issues and processes of internationalization of organizations. 
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particular cultural, strategic and behavioural differences associated with doing business 
in China (Ambler, Witzel, & Xi, 2000). 
Moreover, the rise of Asian firms post challenges for our scholarly theories of business 
and how firms internationalize.  The common distinction is made between East and West, 
viewing Asian business organizations as very different from western ones – for instance, 
they seem to be relying on different governance mechanisms (Zhou, Poppo, & Yang, 
2008; Yang & Wang, 2011).  There are more variances to consider, though, since the 
East/West distinction falls short at times, as we see in our two cases.  We take this 
challenge to be an opportunity to internationalize parts of internationalization theory, and 
to advance both scholarly and practical studies of Asian firms.  One step in that direction, 
we suggest, is to build on, and expand, a behavioural framework to account for 
internationalization processes in Asian firms.  We have in mind an approach that is 
empirically realistic, interdisciplinary and integrative – in the spirit of the ‘old’ 
behavioural theory of Cyert, March and Simon.  Hopefully this can help bridge the huge 
gulf between theory and empirical reality in the international business field which 
Buckley points to.  
In this paper, we can distil several insights that jointly contribute to expanding the 
behavioural approach to account for internationalization processes in Asian firms.  We 
use two mini cases to illustrate the cultural and organizational aspects of 
internationalization decisions.  We illustrate how the two Asian firms of our study view 
their situation internationally, how their priorities differ, and what final decisions they 
make to perform in the international context.  Through utilizing data from observation, 
interviews, as well as content and historical analysis, we aim to build positive theory 
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using mixed methods.8 Such pluralism in method is consistent with Simon (1954) as well 
as the rich roots of the IB field itself (Birkinshaw, Brannan, & Tung, 2011).  Central to 
our theoretical query is an interest in identifying the determinants of path dependence in 
internationalization decisions.  We provide a new way of thinking of such processes.  We 
view an internationalization process as a path dependent process where the actual paths 
that can be taken are driven by a combination of random events and firm policies.  Our 
case studies highlight several of such mechanisms. 
Specifically, we examine internationalization in a Japanese and a Chinese MNEs and find 
that there are striking contrasts, but also notable similarities.  Rather than focusing on 
antecedents of such preferences (Mahnke, et. al., 2012), we explain the contextual drivers 
of decisions, be it the foreign environment they are active on, or the ideological bent of 
the HQ.  Through contrasting means, both companies show a strong preference for agility 
and adaptivity.  The Chinese aim for it through central organization and design, while the 
Japanese reach it through a strong focus on achieving their financial objectives and 
performance excellence.  These observations bring us to a closer scrutiny of prior 
internationalization theory in the light of our observations, a discussion that can be 
centred on three topics – psychic distance, organizational design, and control of 
international expansion – where we see discrepancies between theory and cases.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we review the relevant 
prior literature, section 3 presents our case study of a Japanese MNE, section 4 highlights 
8 Case 1 uses case study as explorative and descriptive research; builds on more than 30 
interviews and dozens of participant observations in meetings over a period of two years, as 
well as culture and climate survey results from the beginning of the study, along with other 
documents on the vision and mission of the branch under investigation. Rhetoric analysis and 
thematic coding were used to make sense of the ongoing challenges of the organization. Case 2 
drafts on content analysis of more than 500 pages of company speeches, employee handbook 
and reports and books covering the history of the organization.  
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the case of our Chinese MNE, and section 5 provides a discussion on elements of a 
behavioural approach that can be extended to Asian firm. 
 
4.3. Literature Review  
As the field of international business has advanced over the last several decades, its 
development to some extent mirrors the development of the strategy field, albeit with 
some time lag.  While strategy research used to be fuelled by the need to think about 
practical problems in a structured way, it has now advanced to develop theory that can 
explain competitive heterogeneity, i.e. why firms have differential performance in 
competitive markets (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994; Rumelt, 2011).  In contrast, 
research in internationalization remains closely related to practice as it advances theories 
that can account for various observed difficulties that firms encounter as they go abroad.  
That is, the field has focused on how firms overcome knowledge barriers – as well as 
other barriers – as they scale up their presence in foreign markets (Hutzschenreuter, 
Pedersen, & Volberda, 2007).  
In their review of research on international business, Rugman, Verbeke, & Nguyen (2011) 
provide a useful summary of how the field has matured: from a focus on international 
trade to analysis of how multinational enterprises employ firm specific advantages as they 
scale up operations across borders.  Theories about international trade basically claim that 
countries differ with respect to factor productivity.  From the point of view of economic 
theory, differences are expressed as productivity differences that stimulate gains from 
trade.  Michael Porter (1990) advanced a version of international trade theory to account 
for differences at the level of industries.  Why is it that some industries in some countries 
are particularly successful?  According to Porter (1990), the differences can be attributed 
to differences in strategies, organization design, and the productivity from the underlying 
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resources that firms employ, i.e. human resources, physical resources, knowledge 
resources, capital resources, and infrastructure.  Some countries have conditions (natural, 
social, as well as political) that stimulate superior performance on some or these 
dimensions.  Porter’s (1990) view on industry advantage is a natural stepping-stone from 
competitiveness at the country level to competitiveness at the firm level.     
Dunning’s (1977, 1988, 1998) eclectic paradigm represents a decisive move from country 
specific advantages towards the multinational enterprise (MNE) as a unit of analysis 
(Eden & Dai 2010; Rugman et al., 2011).  According to the eclectic paradigm, MNEs 
engage in foreign direct investments (FDIs) across borders when they have advantages 
along three dimensions: (O)wnership – superior resources and ways of organizing trade, 
(L)ocation – superior country specific conditions as also elaborated by Porter (1990), and 
(I)nternalization – superior ways of organizing internal transfer of resources relative to 
market exchange.   
The dimension of the process of internalization is particularly important from an 
organizational point of view because it is here that the effect of firm specific learning and 
organization design will ultimately influence performance.  Internationalization is a 
continuing process, not a goal in itself.  Drawing on the behavioural theory of the firm 
(Cyert & March, 1963), researchers in the Uppsala school (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 
1990; 2009; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) have explained that 
internationalization is a fairly slow, incremental process where firms gradually scale up 
their international presence as they gain experience, e.g. from trading with a foreign 
agent, to establishment of a local sales office, to direct investment in production facilities 
(Aharoni, 1966; Rugman et al., 2011).  The underlying idea is that firms take a path of 
least resistance as they gradually overcome the barriers to crossing foreign borders, i.e. 
firms internationalize like “rings in the water” (Madsen & Servais, 1997).  A similar idea 
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is that firms cross borders with the least psychic or cultural distance, and use their 
experience as they gradually proceed to markets that are more distant (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975).   
Thus, it is commonly observed that knowledge about foreign markets must be gained 
through going through an internationalization process (Rugman et al., 2011).  It is also 
broadly agreed that such processes are incremental and path dependent as they build on 
knowledge gained through experience (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007; Rugman et al., 
2011).  An impressive amount of research effort has been spent on describing the 
numerous ways in which these processes are actually path dependent.  We know a lot 
about how firms scale up their international operations.  However, we know less about 
why they aim at achieving a certain level of internationalization, and even less about the 
determinants of long-term success in maintaining international operations 
(Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007).  Not only does the literature focus more on “the problem 
of becoming a multinational than on strategies of established multinationals” 
(Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007, p. 1057), it also downplays the role of organization design, 
for example, with respect to internal division of labour, and internal transfer of resources 
(Rugman et al., 2011).    
Another concern regarding the basic construct of internationalization, as a learning 
process, is that actual observed cases may not follow the theory very well (Rugman et al., 
2011).   While the theory predicts that firms should minimize psychic and cultural 
difference and therefore target neighbouring countries as they begin to scale up 
international operations, several observed cases violate this claim (e.g. Ruigrok & 
Wagner, 2003; Rugman, 2005).  While the idea that firms take a path of least resistance 
as they gradually overcome the barriers to crossing foreign borders is intuitive and 
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attractive, it appears that researchers have not yet been able to identify a valid distance 
(or proximity) measure.   
Below, we present two cases – a Japanese and a Chinese firm – that further illustrate this 
conundrum.  While these countries are geographically close, the two cases show that, on 
relevant dimensions regarding principles of management and organization design, they 
are very different.  For another example, the notion of “born globals” is used to describe 
firms that from inception have operations in multiple countries (Knight & Cavusgil, 1996; 
Madsen & Servais, 1997; Knight, Madsen & Servais, 2004).  Clearly, this observation 
seems to defy the common idea in the internationalization literature that scaling up the 
firm’s international presence is a slow, incremental and path dependent process.  Or 
perhaps, it is yet another symptom that the metric used to measure distance – or barriers 
– in international expansion is problematic.  Thus, Rugman et al. (2011) suggest that 
patterns of internationalization may be explained by a measure of compounded distance 
including cultural, institutional, economic and geographic distance components as well 
as possible (nonlinear) interactions among these components.  
In the literature sketched so far, the MNE has been the unit of analysis, i.e. the MNE has 
been treated like a unitary actor.  Over the last two decades, the literature has forcefully 
moved from the corporate level to consider the underlying subsidiaries that constitute the 
business units of the MNE (Birkinshaw, 1996, 1997).  This development has paved the 
way for analysing each subsidiary with the RBV framework developed in strategy 
research (Rumelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).  Thus, the resource profile of each subsidiary can 
be analysed with respect to their possible contribution to overall competitive advantage.  
The added complication is that complementarities among resources in a collection of 
subsidiaries must also be considered (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009).  This development 
highlights the role of subsidiary management as well as the role of organization design in 
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allocating resources and integrating contributions from subsidiaries.  However, the role 
of organization design (in leveraging the value of resources) within subsidiaries is still 
downplayed.    
Theories in the literature have been derived from empirical observations of Western 
firms.  For example, the Uppsala model of the internationalization process of the firm 
was a descriptive approach (Johansson & Vahlne, 2009) developed from observations of 
Scandinavian firms with small domestic markets.  For another example, the notion of 
“born globals” was developed from empirical observations of firms with mall domestic 
markets (Rugman & Almodóvar, 2011).  These examples are symptomatic of a tendency 
in the internationalization literature to develop theory around empirical observations, and 
in both cases, theory has failed when it was confronted with empirical observations from 
different countries.  A related problem is that context matters for generalizability of theory 
and the importance of the types of distances involved (Ghemawat, 2001).  When an 
American firm expands its operations to Shenzhen in China or Tokyo in Japan, the 
geographical distance is similar, but the cultural difference is immense.  The other way 
around, when a Japanese or a Chinese firm expands internationally, it is likely that their 
strategies and modes of operating reflect a systematic approach that differs from any 
American or Scandinavian firm.  Thus, we need theory that can account for general 
principles conditional on international context and cultural differences, as well as 
differences in how the dissimilar cultures influences the psychologies in the market (as 
Walmart learned the hard way when it realized that people in China do not make decisions 
about products the same way they do in Kansas).   
Our brief review of the internationalization literature highlights impressive advances as 
well as notable gaps.  Among the most important gaps, we wish to highlight that the role 
of organization design has been downplayed, both in international expansion, and as an 
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important determinant of long-term success in maintaining international operations.  By 
downplaying the role of organization design, we mean that MNEs have been treated like 
unitary actors, or as a collection of subsidiaries that, in turn, have been analysed as unitary 
actors.  We believe that downplaying the role of organizational design as a determinant 
of internationalization also has implications for the failure of the notion of distance (or 
proximity) to describe observed patterns of internationalization.  While distance in terms 
of fit of a resource profile relative to demands in a particular market is important, we also 
find that organization design has an essential role in leveraging these resources in daily 
operations as well as in maintaining control of operations as the firm expands, or aims to 
maintain, its international presence.  For example, the type of learning in organizations 
could be designed to promote vicarious learning for the HQ through absorbing the 
contextual signals of the foreign subsidiaries, or designed to focus on monitoring the 
foreign subsidiaries in order to maintain a uniform ideology and identity throughout the 
HQ and its branches (Huber, 1991; Manz & Sims, 1981).  Below, we further advance our 
approach.   
 
4.4. Case Study 1 – A Japanese MNE  
The first case study is on a Japanese MNE, which we call A-Med in this paper.9 It was 
established in 1930s, with headquarters in Tokyo, and specialized in manufacturing and 
sales of healthcare and life-care products.  It has branches in the Americas, Europe, 
Middle East, Africa, and Asia-Pacific, with more than 20,000 employees worldwide.  We 
are here looking at the firm’s subsidiary in Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA). 
9 The case study of A-Med was conducted in the period of 2011-13 (see more detailed 
description in introduction).  
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Based on top management's 2011 internal survey, the main challenges facing A-Med are 
related to two basic areas: profitability and identity.  The first area captures the financial 
performance, and ultimately survival, whereas the second area points to a company-wide 
need to be recognized in the eyes of the end costumers and other stakeholders.  The 
internal survey suggests that the brand and the overarching integrity of the company's 
identity is neither known to their employees nor their clients.  
A-Med is owned solely by Japanese citizens – all middle-aged and male – with a strong 
and perhaps over-emphasized focus on detailed information regarding financial activities, 
formal communication through budget and expenditure forms, and informal 
communication through their 'representatives' in almost every area of operation.  In 
contrast, top management of the EMEA subsidiary is an international team, consisting of 
people who are mostly educated – and with prior professional experience – in the US.  
All EMEA's top managers are younger in age, and   the gender balance is not as skewed 
as is in the group of owners.  The EMEA top managers jointly cover a rather broad area 
of focus, which is tailored to the country they are working in.  For example, strong R&D-
focus in Japan, Legal requirements in the UK, Services in Germany, Sales in France, Cost 
reduction in Italy, etc. 
In the paragraphs below, we briefly explain the main problems observed during the two-
year study of A-Med's EMEA subsidiary.  An interesting observation is that even though 
problems such as tensions relating to structure, attitude, and communication are 
persistent, the EMEA subsidiary performed successfully at the time our case study ended 
(as assessed by Japanese HQ).  Despite the success of EMEA, our case study revealed 
several problems, which are here grouped under three main categories – cultural 
differences, unclear communication, R&D and market orientation – that emerged during 
the case study.   
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Cultural differences.  The main cause for tension mentioned by the managers and 
employees, is 'cultural' difference; the longer the employees have been with the company, 
the more they feel unappreciated by the recently hired team.  The family-like culture of 
the Japanese organization makes a vivid contrast to the success and achievement oriented 
culture of the U.S educated managers in the subsidiary.  Furthermore, since people are 
coming from a variety of geographical locations, they tend to attribute most problems to 
their cultural differences.  These differences are manifested in many ways.  For instance, 
there is loss of trust because of random-looking procedures of praise and promotion, 
threatening work environment because of language related provocations, and break down 
of communication. 
While the Japanese HQ has a clear and rather rigid approach to structuring the 
organization, the same level of structural rigidity does not apply to the EMEA subsidiary.  
From the interviews with managers who have been with the company for more than 10 
years, it seems that the recent managerial changes, i.e. bringing in the recently hired top 
management team, has left the EMEA subsidiary in a complex situation, with a dramatic 
increase in the number of decisions that should be made.  On one hand, there is a 
noticeable clash between the more formal and hierarchical structure in the HQ, and the 
less formal structure in EMEA.  On the other hand, the information about the structure is 
not clearly or formally communicated from HQ to EMEA.  
Finally, there is a big debate in the HQ as well as EMEA about the size and structure of 
the entire organization, with one camp advocating for a big and strong organization and 
the other campaigning for a small and agile one.  The topic of this debate obviously 
reflects a critically important disagreement regarding the firm’s organizational structure.  
Based on statements from EMEA management and HQ members, there is a clear gap 
between what the two sides perceive as their goals; on the EMEA side, the emphasis is 
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on adaptability to the environment, high independence, and achieving short term goals.  
On the HQ side, it is all the opposite: emphasis on efficiency, hierarchy, and long-term 
goals.  
Unclear communication.  As for communication, it is not just the common daily 
conversations that seem to suffer from the above-mentioned cultural problems.  On a 
higher level, it is observed that when it comes to general understanding of the brand, the 
vision and mission, as well as the main values and goals of the organization, there are 
neither clear channels of communication, nor clear attempts to build one.  Even though 
in theory there are designed communication channels, in practice they are not used, either 
because they are not taken seriously, or because they are actually not functional.  It 
appears that smaller sub-groups have been formed in the organization – either based on 
functional or personal acquaintance – that exchange information about issues and updates, 
while leaving the rest of the organization in the dark.  A common complaint is that many 
of the employees, especially those without the network of professional and personal 
connections, must learn about the new strategies, changes, and decisions, through the 
international media, which, understandably, creates dissatisfaction and mistrust.  In 
addition to that, more common problems that are main consequences of poor 
communication arise in the organization, such as lack of knowledge sharing regarding 
best practices, innovative ideas, and general guidelines on problem solutions. 
When all is said and done, it could be argued that the underlying demotivating factor for 
the individual managers is the misalignment of expectations and demands on various 
levels.  On one hand, people do not know exactly what they are supposed to deliver to 
their regional managers, and on the other, they are not committed to the better known 
more general HQ expectations either, since, to them, there is no obvious link between 
reward and positive (or constructive) behaviour.  The 'orders' that come from HQ are seen 
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as unrealistic and fussy, while the more local strategies are criticized as being too tough 
and one sided. 
Responding to that criticism, Japanese HQ claims that the 'orders' are mere suggestions 
and they are actually looking for feedback from the EMEA managers via comparing 
actual outcomes with documents on forecasts for future profit and expenditure.  However, 
on the other side of the story, EMEA managers claim that their voice is not heard at HQ, 
and they are mostly burdened by HQ's rather pointless demands and orders. 
R&D and market orientation.  One of the main complaints of EMEA managers relates to 
their inability to respond to their local markets and clients.  They, rightly, claim that since 
they are in direct contact with the end users/buyers and the environment in which they 
must perform, they are the best people to have a say on what R&D needs to focus on.  
This proves to be a major problem, since the R&D labs are exclusively at the HQ and are 
ran independently by the Japanese HQ.  Furthermore, since there are no direct lines of 
communication between the EMEA team and R&D, even in instances where R&D's 
projects are in fact aligned with the needs of EMEA markets, the mutual ignorance of 
these facts becomes counterproductive.  This issue seems to be one where the top 
managers of the EMEA subsidiary do not have any hope of improvement in sight.  
First of all, it should be mentioned that the EMEA subsidiary ended as the highest 
performing subsidiary in the MNE despite the obvious issues, complaints, and the chaotic 
nature of communications between EMEA and HQ.  At the end of our study, the EMEA 
subsidiary managed to outperform all other subsidiaries, and received various rewards 
from the Japanese HQ.  It is therefore interesting to gauge the elements of organization 
design that contributed to that outcome.  
EMEA's communication with the Japanese HQ favoured a combination of ambiguity 
regarding process control while admitting rigid control and commitment on observable 
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financial outcomes.  EMEA kept HQ content by delivering financial reports exactly the 
way the HQ wanted, meanwhile challenging them regarding procedure to gain more 
autonomy.  EMEA created (some) ambiguity on process by delaying reports to HQ for a 
while – for example, EMEA would delay information on spending on equipment, or 
customer satisfaction, but would then usually compensate that with a bigger contract, or 
more sales.  
Another way EMEA would create ambiguity was to talk about overcoming 'the challenge' 
while the specifications and attributes of 'the challenge' would keep on changing 
throughout time (culture, communication, R&D, sales, integration, etc.) It appears that 
the balance between local autonomy for EMEA and the rigid structure HQ imposed is 
gained through an interesting communication strategy that put a premium on local 
autonomy regarding daily operations.  That is, EMEA would consistently communicate 
a solid image of their goals and operations to HQ (firmly committing to agreed final 
objective of profitability), while taking advantage of any communication blind spot or 
loopholes to get some space to explore the possible advantages of autonomy.  In that 
regard, the relation between EMEA and HQ seems to mimic a market like construction 
with high-powered incentives.  Following a similar logic, also EMEA's management style 
offered lots of autonomy to its lower level managers, but no excuses were accepted for 
not delivering as agreed – the final result would mean everything.   
The constant change of the ultimate objective of the organization from the perspectives 
of EMEA managers seems to be a fairly interesting observation in this case study.  There 
would be no admission of failure, even though many of the earlier goals were never 
achieved, or not even approached.  Instead, the modifications of the goals keep the 
individuals going for a while, treating them as winners, and giving them more 
opportunities to explore and benefit from structural loopholes provided by loose process 
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control.  As we shall see, this mode of operations is sharply at odds with the way the 
Chinese MNE in our study handled relations to its subsidiaries.   
 
4.5. Case Study 2 – A Chinese MNE  
Our second case is on a Chinese telecom company, which started modestly in 1980s in 
Shenzhen, let’s call it T-Com.10 At the very beginning it was a private enterprise telecom 
equipment manufacturer for local Chinese companies.  Its most obvious competitive 
advantage was, early on, low cost engineering, rather than low cost manufacturing (Zeng 
& Williamson, 2003).  T-Com expanded rapidly from rural to developed areas, and then 
from domestic to international markets.  It is now one of China’s most important 
organizations operating in over 170 countries, a position gained through an aggressive 
internationalization campaign.  
Founded by a charismatic leader (who was demobilized from the Chinese army before 
founding the company), T-Com's growth was based on a strong competitor focus, and a 
keen understanding of the company’s strengths relative to the opportunities and threats 
present in its broader environment (e.g. political and technological environment).  The 
leader is very engaged in the day-to-day business and highly focused on competitors’ 
performance.  Thus, he would often visit other companies for inspiration.  
The leader stated that he wanted to combine the hardworking spirit from the Japanese, 
the strict work ethic from the Germans, and the creative and innovative spirit of the US, 
10  This case study is based on content analysis of 500 pages of speeches by the company 
founder, as well as analysis of other source material, including an employee handbook and 3 
business cases written about them.  
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while maintaining a clear Chinese cultural edge. 11  At the same time, Maoist and 
communist ideology drove much of T-Com’s early success.  The leader adopted a classic 
Maoist mass campaign strategy for growth domestically – occupying first the countryside 
to encircle the cities.  By deploying large numbers of staff into rural provinces where 
competitors had no presence, he could build alliances with local outfits, establish joint 
ventures with other firms, and seize monopoly on hardware distribution.  
T-Com’s leader pursued and built domestic capabilities before starting the process of 
internationalization – thus developing long term capabilities and networks (March 2006), 
rather than plunging into an international adventure demanding a quick, and somewhat 
random expansion of the firm's resource base.  The firms culture and its approach to 
internationalization has been described as the ‘wolf spirit’ which includes at least three 
major aspects: a sensitive nose for good opportunities, mounting an attack when an 
opportunity emerges – aggressive and adamant, firmly grabbing onto prey and not letting 
them go – and persistence during attack.  
T-Com’s approach to internationalization – as well as its domestic strategy – has been 
built on and cultivated by a keen awareness and understanding of the firm’s own strengths 
and weaknesses, and that of their competitors.  That is, T-Com’s internationalization path 
has not solely been based on the firm’s ownership advantages as suggested by the 
“eclectic paradigm”.  The Uppsala perspective comes closer, but does not fully capture 
the emergent and adaptive nature of their strategy and internationalization path.  
Cultural differences.  To better understand T-Com’s internationalization strategy, it is 
helpful to look at the Chinese approach to strategic decision-making and action (Jullien, 
11 Asked about who had influenced him, he responded “Chairman Mao and President Louis 
Gerstner”, the former CEO of IBM; Mao for his guerrilla tactics and Gerstner for his ‘customer 
centric’ approach.  
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2004).  In Western thought as well as most internationalization theory, we insist on a 
sharp dichotomy between theory and reality.  A description of a strategic action, or, for 
that matter, any action, is viewed from the perspective of an external observer in a way 
that is distinct from the action itself.  This is so ingrained in western thought that we no 
longer question it.12 
The fundamental challenge in understanding how the Chinese approach to decision 
making differs from western thinking is both a philosophical and a practical one.  
Westerners tend to think of reality in terms of distinct (or modular) ideal forms, which 
obviously leads to failure when reality is more complex than its representation.  By 
contrast, Jullien finds that the Chinese never establish a framework of ideal forms and 
models, but see reality as a continuous process that results from the interaction of factors 
that are both opposed and complementary.  Order, therefore, does not come from a model 
(or from a deviation from a model) but is contained within reality itself, therefore 
transcending the theory-practice relationship.  To explicate what that means for decision 
making, Jullien uses images and proverbs that were used by ancient Chinese authors and 
illustrate that (strategic) action is not so much about ‘fixing’ a given situation or impose 
a model on reality, but rather about a continuous unfolding process, to which one must 
always adapt, see coherence in situations, and profit from how they evolve.13 As he notes: 
12 As Jullien writes: “This is one of the most characteristic moves made by the modern Western 
world (or maybe quite simply the world as a whole – if it has been standardized in accordance 
with the Western model): a revolutionary designs the model of the city that must be built; a 
soldier sets out the plan of war to be followed; an economist decides on the growth curve to 
target; and, all of them, whatever their respective roles, operate in a similar way. Each one 
projects upon the world an ideal plan that will then have to be incorporated into factual 
reality…. Our inclination is to extend to everything this model-making” (2004, p. 3). 
13 As he notes: “From this perspective that we have discovered, we could deduce an alternative 
way of behaving. Instead of constructing an ideal Form what we then project onto things, we 
could try to detect the factors whose configuration is favourable to the task at hand; instead of 
setting up a goal for our actions, we could allow ourselves to be carried along by the propensity 
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“From this perspective that we have discovered, we could deduce an alternative way of 
behaving.  Instead of constructing an Ideal Form that we then project onto things, we 
could try to detect the factors whose configuration is favourable to the task at hand; 
instead of setting up a goal for our actions, we could allow ourselves to be carried along 
by the propensity of things.  In short, instead of imposing our plan upon the world, we 
could rely on the potential inherent in the situation” (p. 16).  
Thus, he finds that Chinese thinking grows around two basic concepts: the configuration 
or the situation (‘xing’) that unfolds and can be used to one’s advantage, and the idea of 
‘potential’ (‘shi’) that can be used to one’s advantage.  A key to strategy is thus to rely 
on the inherent potential of the situation and to allow it to evolve and become part of its 
evolution.  Or, in the words of Leites and Pye, “ride with external forces”, it is more of a 
“non” effort than a deliberate planning process (Pye & Leites, p. 4).  
From that perspective, internationalization is something emergent and adaptive where 
opportunities are created and utilized in an organic way, whenever it is possible.  The 
company learns through FDI and globalization and uses the gained knowledge to build 
greater absorptive capacity and ability to operate domestically and internationally.  
Internationalization itself becomes a learning process, less about seeing short-term profit 
opportunities, and more about long-term adaptive potentials.  A key to strategy and 
internationalization is thus to understand and rely on the inherent potential of the situation 
and to allow it to evolve – and to become part of its evolution.  This approach may be 
thought of as an adaptive design that aims to benefit from realizing the potential of an 
evolutionary process outside the control of the firm.  
of things. In short, instead of imposing our plan upon the world, we could rely on the potential 
inherent in the situation” (p. 16). 
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Importance of learning from others.  According to Chinese philosophy, an important part 
of embracing the situation at hand is having a proper understanding of one’s own position 
– and that of others – through reflection, self-reflection, and self-criticism.  This is a key 
tenet of communist philosophy in China.  The appointed leader would typically encourage 
employees to conduct self-criticism sessions – to be hard on themselves, but not on others 
– as a key to ongoing learning.  For instance, in the initial stages of their 
internationalization, T-Com understood that a weakness of theirs was management, so 
they carefully studied management in organizations such as IBM and recruited 
consultants to help them understand the phenomenon.  Because of their thorough 
approach, innovation and internationalization has been a slow and incremental process.  
They believe in gaining competence before confidence, and that growth is not necessarily 
the only way forward (thus, avoiding the myth that one always must grow). 
Adaptiveness and agility is also built into their training programs.  The firm has boot-
camps where employees are asked to take an oath of “duty, honour, company, and 
country” when they first enter the organization (instilling a sense of loyalty and 
organizational identification, Simon 1991).  As explained by the leader, T-Com also has 
ideology training: “We’ve established an ideology mentor training system.  It’s an 
ideology mentor system set up by the central research department’s Party branch, mainly 
with Party members, and it was started to provide guidance to new employees”.  
Interestingly, the party’s history is also baked into the firm’s training programs.  Thus, T-
Com’s leader demands that senior managers explicitly study lessons from the Annals of 
Party history: “We have cadres at the division level and higher study the book ‘Hu 
Yaobang and the Vindication of the Miscarriages of Justice.’ We need to learn about Hu 
Yaobang’s open-mindedness, his extreme responsibility for Party endeavours, and his 
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spirit in courageously upholding the truth.  We must also study the suffering the 
revolutionaries of the older generation experienced, their hopeful strong will.”  
Leadership style.  We observed a strong relational style in leadership that is inspired by 
Confucius rather than Weber’s notion of charismatic leadership.  The leader sees 
secretaries as unsung heroes.  He goes to trade shows and hands out flyers, and stands in 
line with others in the company cafeteria.  These behaviours help encourage and build 
organizational identification and loyalty (Simon 1991, 1993).  
 Organizational and national loyalty.  The leader of T-Com is aware that 
mechanisms for identifying with the larger social system – the organization and society 
– are powerful (indirect) ways to motivate and encourage behaviours.  So, rather than 
incentivizing employees through short-term pursuits, the leader aims to instil a moral 
sense of loyalty in the group, the organization, and the corporate culture.  It seems that, 
as Alex George (1967) suggests, it was precisely such nurturing of morale – through 
nurturing relations and creating loyalties – that was a key strength of the Chinese 
Communist Army.  He also noted that, not only did the creation of social mechanisms 
through induction and training advance narrow competence for particular functions, but 
also a re-socialization that would influence them in all aspects.   
As an organizational mechanism, loyalty and identification contrasts with the western 
notion of pursuit of self-interests as incorporated in western theories since at least Adam 
Smith (and prominent in, for instance, Williamson).  This indicates a fundamental 
difference in the very conception of ‘economy’ and economies.  Western theories and 
measures of economics and economic issues rely on some very basic ideas: even if 
modern economists can argue about rationality vs. bounded rationality, monetarism, 
Keynesianism, new classical macroeconomics, etc. – they mostly do not question the 
underlying conception of individuals pursuing utility (be it through the invisible hand of 
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the market or the visible feet of the institutions they are in).  Firms maximize shareholder 
wealth and profit, or at least try to do so.  But a Chinese (or Confucian) conception of 
economics is different.  One China-scholar has argued that the ‘economic principles of 
Confucius’ consist of land, capital and ‘virtuous’ men.  This latter concept seems quite 
different from our conception of self-interest.  In addition, pursuing economic profit or 
motives are not enough – one must also have a purpose beyond oneself.  That is, a firm 
must have a purpose beyond itself – so there is a longer term and essentially social aspect 
of the very meaning of Chinese economics.14 This may explain some of the differences 
in organizational identification and the emphasis on culture and organization (not just 
profit).  
 
4.6. Discussion: Extending a Behavioural Approach to Asian Firms  
We have examined two cases – a Japanese and a Chinese MNE – that offer striking 
contrasts, but also notable similarities.  As we have seen in the case descriptions, the 
ideological differences in the nature of the two firms – in terms of their organization 
design, control structure, and priorities – are easily detectable in the way the managers 
identify their companies.  From the dialogues and communications of managers at A-
Med, we perceive a pragmatic and sharp orientation towards profitability and financial 
performance, while the behaviour of the managers and the paths they take to reach their 
goals were neither emphasized nor discussed during the two years that we gathered data 
from the company.  At the management meetings, the specifics of what each branch does 
to reach its financial targets are not of anyone's interest.  Instead, the EMEA team and 
14 In “Great Learning”, Confucius wrote: “The superior man must be careful about his virtue 
first. Having virtue, there will be the man. Having the man, there will be the land. Having the 
land, there will be wealth. Having the wealth, there will be its use. Virtue is the root”. 
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their subordinates constantly focus on questions about short run cost and benefit.  
Evidence of this mindset is reflected in the case report and key findings presented above.  
By contrast, we clearly observe a very different orientation in the narration of the case of 
the Chinese T-Com.  The leader (note that there is a leader figure rather than a mere 
managerial function) and other employees spend a good deal of effort and time on 
elaborating their philosophy.  There is an obvious way of life that they identify with, and 
the corporate life at T-Com seems to be a meaningful part of their personal identity.  Thus, 
the description of the Chinese case follows from their attention to the details regarding 
the ideological trainings, importance of loyalty, and elaborate explanations on where such 
ideas come from.  We find such variety in data type to be an indicator of the deep 
difference in how these two firms in neighbouring countries have been formed and 
managed. 
All the loyalty, sacrifice, and allegiance that are core to the Chinese way of management 
are compensated by a rather blunt focus on the bottom line in the Japanese company.  
Rather than acting like brave soldiers, managers in the Japanese subsidiary go about 
covering their own backs, creating the most plausible story in retrospect to convince the 
HQ.  In some sense, while the Chinese have dedicated themselves to "duty, honour, 
company, and country", their Japanese counterparts have taken an oath to protect the 
profitability of their individual branches, so that they can secure their jobs, perks, and 
prestige.  
However, through contrasting means, both companies show a strong preference for agility 
and adaptivity.  The Chinese aim for it through central organization and design, while the 
Japanese reach it through a strong focus on achieving their financial objectives and 
performance excellence.  Such similarity could hint at the demands on both organizations 
from their task environments and broader culture, as both companies use rigid control and 
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reporting protocols.  These observations bring us to a closer scrutiny of our two case 
studies in the light of prior internationalization theory where we see discrepancies 
between theory and cases.  Based on the observations from our case studies, this 
discussion can be centred on three topics: psychic distance, organizational design, and 
control of international expansion.  
Psychic distance.  Internationalization theory suggests that national culture affects 
management practices, such as strategic decision making (Schneider & DeMeyer, 1991), 
leadership style (Dorfman & Howell, 1988; Puffer, 1993), and human resource 
management (Luthans, Welsh, & Rosenkrantz, 1993).  National culture is also known to 
be inclined towards producing a specific organizational design (Noorderhaven & 
Harzing, 2003, 2008).  Furthermore, geographic proximity is supposed to indicate cultural 
proximity, and thus less psychic distance (Madsen & Servais, 1997; Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975).  We believe that such prediction would 
normally hold when it comes to individuals within a national culture because many 
determinants of decision-making style and behaviours are widely shared.  For instance, 
strong factors like language, historical heritage, geographical and climate conditions, 
political predispositions, education systems, religion, etc., would affect most individuals 
in the same way, resulting in a degree of cultural homogeneity and predictability in the 
way they generate alternatives and make decisions.  However, when it comes to a 
multinational enterprise, these determinants are not necessarily as homogeneous as they 
are within national culture. 
The specific ways, be it cultural or non-cultural, in which each individual manager acts, 
reacts, and interacts with her task environment, with stakeholders, and with HQ, would 
influence the firm’s development along a broad range of paths depending on personal 
style and talent as well as other factors that are shared within a culture.  Moreover, the 
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way organization design aggregates individual contributions – e.g. in decision making 
(Christensen & Knudsen, 2010) or search for innovations (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014) – 
appears to have notable effect over and above personal and cultural factors.  As illustrated 
in our cases studies, organization design had a notable effect regarding what kind of 
information that was aggregated, i.e. information regarding process in the Chinese MNE 
and regarding outcome in the Japanese MNE.   
The upshot of our observations is that treating an MNE as a unitary actor belonging to a 
specific national culture may prove problematic both for theory and for empirical work.  
The Asian firms in our study are cases in point.  While China and Japan belong to the 
same geographical area of Asia, the firms in our study manifest very different attributes 
when it comes to their organization design, control structure, and agent behaviour.  Thus, 
along with others (Rugman et al., 2011), we suggest that the notion of psychic (or any 
other mono-dimensional) distance itself is of fairly limited value as a predictor of 
internationalization patterns.  What we need is a framework, which, in addition to 
cultural, psychological, and geographic proximity, includes dimensions such as 
organization design, organizational structure, and agent behaviour.  Thus, we suggest that 
a metric such as Rugman et al.’s (2011) compounded distance (including cultural, 
institutional, economic and geographic distance) should also include components that 
capture essential dimensions of organization design (such as information structure, task 
structure, and control structure).    
Role of organization design.  As a company extends its operations in new areas, be it 
geographically or otherwise, it is presented with numerous opportunities to learn from its 
exposure to the rather novel environments (Argote, 1999).  Understanding and clearly 
formulating the new challenges, searching for possible new solutions to meet these 
challenges, and applying promising solutions to the newly encountered problems are 
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essential ways in which companies develop and use their knowledge base (Levinthal & 
March 1981; Argote, 1999).  However, the role of organization design determines the 
type of problems the firms will most likely face, as well as the type of solutions that they 
are more likely to look for (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007, Csaszar, 2013).  
It seems that one major difference in how companies set up their international operations 
and communications is whether their HQ is inward or outward looking (Welch & 
Luostarinen, 1993; Korhonen, Luostarinen & Welch, 1996; Korhonen, 1999) when it 
comes to strategic planning.  An inward-looking company would have a strong focus on 
modelling its subsidiaries based on settings defined in HQ regarding hierarchy, power, 
and decision-making procedures.  In such a case, the necessity of tight control over 
procedures, detailed goals, and rule-abidance is rather obvious.  The Chinese company in 
our study fits the bill.  Setting up new operations, hiring and training of new employees, 
and communicating with them, all follow a well-defined blueprint including a rather strict 
set of very detailed protocols and routines.  Such preparation, nevertheless, does not 
eliminate the uncertainties of the pristine environment altogether.  Armed with loyal and 
dedicated employees who are undoubtedly faithful to every value that the company holds; 
the international subsidiary must now face the challenges of an entirely new task 
environment.  As the employees learn about the new task environment and its challenges, 
they will have to try and make decisions using the framework they were given from HQ.  
So, it is a process where HQ gets to learn through experiments, just not by themselves, 
rather by the far away arm of the subsidiary – as a sort of vicarious learning (Ingram & 
Baum, 1997; Miner & Haunschild, 1995).  
In contrast, an outward looking company would keep an eye on what it wants from its 
international operations, define financial goals for subsidiary performance and demand 
that these are met, without bothering about the details of how things get done, and whether 
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everything is meticulously planned at HQ.  Under such circumstances, the subsidiaries 
will have to learn by experimentation in their local task environment.  They might have 
the advantage of hiring people who know the local environment, thus reducing risks of 
untoward events, but these local managers would still need to learn about the business 
and the demands of HQ.  Our Japanese case provides evidence of a company that is very 
much managed in this way.  Once the owners and top management at HQ have 
communicated their ultimate demand of profitability to the EMEA subsidiary, they 
become rather tolerant, and accepting when it comes to the means to get there.  Having 
said that, the Japanese HQ is not that tolerant regarding failure to deliver on demand, and 
the subsidiary is warned of severe consequences of failure.  It is noteworthy that demands 
imposed on A-Med’s subsidiaries need not be identical.  For instance, while EMEA is 
entirely focused on sales and profits, the Asian subsidiary is working on R&D.   
The way HQ manages relations to their subsidiaries in our two cases reflect very different 
principles and ideas about organization design.  As we have noted, the relation between 
the Japanese EMEA and HQ seems to mimic a market like construction with an elevated 
level of local autonomy that is countered by fairly high-powered incentives.  In contrast, 
the Chinese T-Com was governed by a well-defined blueprint developed at HQ, a 
blueprint that included a rather strict set of very detailed protocols and routines.  These 
observations point to well-known topics regarding differences in internalizing, or 
absorbing learning processes from subsidiaries to HQs, and thereby differences in the 
way management controls international expansion.  
Control of international expansion.  Our two cases have highlighted subsidiary control as 
one of the most salient dimensions where the Japanese and Chinese MNE differed in their 
approach to managing international expansion.  We now wish to highlight how crucial 
differences in behavioural control relating to organizational routines, organizational 
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conflict, propensity to embrace ambiguity, and organizational identity jointly contribute 
to a more detailed understanding of how Asian firms manage their international 
subsidiaries.  
Organizational routines.  A central insight from behavioural theory is that individuals and 
routines (or rules of thumb) are learned from experience or from the experience of others 
(March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000).  Managers do not seek to calculate the consequences of 
alternatives, but they rather rely on one or more routines.  Understanding organizational 
routines is thus central to understanding how the business performs, and studies of 
routines in Asian organizations are central for advancing our understanding of Asian 
internationalization behaviour.  
Some organizational routines are developed alongside the values of the organization, as 
in the Chinese case, where the way employees see themselves at the service of, and being 
loyal to, the company influences the development of routines regarding hiring, training, 
and performance evaluation.  Yet, that is not the only source of creation and development 
of routines.  The Japanese case is a vivid example of adoption of routines that are formed 
through the success of more informal and rule-breaking practices of managers when 
dealing with the rigid demands of the HQ.  That is to say, in the Chinese case, the HQ has 
a more visible control on formation and adoption of organizational routines.  In the 
Japanese company, by contrast, the EMEA subsidiary has taken initiative to showcase 
successful ways of achieving autonomy.  
Organizational conflict.  Business organizations as well as other institutions are 
fundamentally social in nature and embedded in the larger institutional and historical 
context of which they are part.  Behavioural work on political organizations emphasizes 
the inefficiency of history, the ways in which history is path dependent, and the ways in 
which actions stems from social identities (March, 2006, 2010; March & Olsen, 1975).  
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Rules are again central, as actions do not result from calculating consequences, but rather 
from matching situations to rules that may be appropriate to the situation.  Thus, further 
studies of how identity drives behaviour of organizations in Asia would help us 
understand how their rules change over time, in all stages of internationalization.  
In our case studies, we observed how a long-term perspective, along with the organic 
growth focus of the Chinese company, would more often than not translate into a lower 
level of organizational conflict between HQ and the subsidiaries.  How various actions 
relating to internalization are planned and executed is highly dependent on the existing 
rules and regulations as given from the Chinese HQ.  This leaves less room for 
intervention in HQ policies by subsidiaries in response to internal or external demands.  
However, in the Japanese case, organizational conflict has been one of the most 
prominent themes right from the beginning of the case study.  What the EMEA managers 
bring from stakeholder demands is classified and rooted in their struggle to persuade their 
Japanese HQ to implement changes in the control structure of the organization.  Although 
there is a Japanese way of doing things that pretty much rules everything that goes on at 
the HQ in Japan, EMEA's interaction with HQ does not always follow that rule.  
Embracing Ambiguity.  A central issue in (March’s) behavioural work is the way in which 
decision makers and organizations deals with issues of uncertainty and ambiguity in 
goals, as well as in environments and in experience (March, 1978, 2010).  Embracing 
ambiguity is difficult and conflicts with many central aspects of Western theories of 
rational choice and stable preferences (March, 1978).  But ambiguity is a key concept 
when it comes to understanding much of Asian philosophy and practice (Jullien, 2011; 
Amber, Witzel & Xi, 2000).  Studying the decision-making process in Asian business 
organizations, and understanding how they handle the challenges of ambiguity, may be 
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key, not only to understanding Asian business practices, but also for future development 
of behavioural theories. 
Given the various levels of control that the firms in our study exert on subsidiaries, it 
appears that they operate with various levels of ambiguity.  With tighter control over 
routines and procedures, the Chinese company would have fewer sources of ambiguity to 
deal with.  They choose their environments and employees very carefully, to make sure 
that all endeavours are aligned with the bigger purpose of the firm.  Losing control over 
many critical decisions made in subsidiaries would increase the level of ambiguity 
regarding the decisions made at HQ.  That is the case of the Japanese company.  Having 
less rigid control over knowledge flows, decisions, and operations at the EMEA 
subsidiary means that the HQ in Japan would have to manage a higher level of ambiguity 
regarding their decisions about their international operations.  But, surprisingly, the way 
these companies embrace their inherent ambiguities is not only vastly different, but also 
quite unanticipated from our point of view.  
The Chinese company's leadership is consistently concentrating on upholding a sense of 
urgency and crisis, which, in practice, leads to an elevated level of ambiguity.  With 
unknown, unidentifiable, and rather unclear circumstances that a sense of crisis entails, it 
is difficult to assume knowledge about all aspects of decisions to be made.  On the 
contrary, even though the Japanese company is in reality facing a far bigger level of 
ambiguity in the organization, (as described above), the firm's customary way of 
addressing current issues is mainly focused on achieving success in terms of meeting pre-
set goals.  The explanation around the goals in question and the ways to reach them 
constantly changed throughout the study, but the managers acted as if it was the very 
same goal they had started to pursue from the very beginning.  In their interaction, the 
Japanese HQ and their EMEA subsidiary would frequently present changes in plans, 
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goals, and strategies as a natural and expected part of previously agreed schemas.  It is 
usually the case that either HQ or EMEA would introduce a subtle and unacknowledged 
change in the plan, which previously both parties had agreed to.  The new, changed plan 
would then be followed as if it had always been an unspecified detail, waiting for the right 
interpretation.  In such situations, neither party admits to a deviation in agenda and 
forecast, instead decides to go with the current interpretation of the bigger master plan.  
In this way, the challenges are rather successfully masked as a small and foreseen part of 
a grand design for the international operations, thus inferring little ambiguity.  
Organizational identification.  One of the most fundamental differences in Asian firms is 
the centrality of the concept and practice of ‘guanxi’.  Literally, ‘guanxi’ means 
connections, relations or relationships (Chen, Chen & Xin, 2004).  In the scholarly 
research of business organizations, it is often defined as the existence of direct 
particularistic ties between two or more individuals (Tsui & Fahj, 1997).  The presence 
of guanxi means that decision makers embrace the premise of limited rationality, and rely 
on identity and networks rather than calculation, transaction cost, and opportunism when 
making decisions.15 This is consistent with the behavioural ideas on group loyalty and 
organizational identification, and the social benefits of altruistic behaviour (Simon, 
1993).  Simon argued that organizational identification is a form of group loyalty and a 
‘powerful altruistic force’ that influences both decision-makers’ goals and their 
perception of the situations (1993, p. 160).  Guanxi be a mechanism and a way of 
organizational identification, which helps explain the comparative advantages of many 
15 An important code of conduct (and source of loyalty) is extended to a network of close 
relationships (guanxi) among people with common background (birthplace, lineage, surname or 
experience). Although essentially non-instrumentalist in nature, it is an important instrument in 
China in Chinese politicians building electorates; businessmen building businesses, etc. (Fahn, 
Tsui, Xin & Chen, 1998).  
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Asian firms, and in fact it may be consistent with Sun Tzu’s insight that leaders (generals) 
cannot rely on utilitarian principles and rewards to motivate organizational members 
(Wee, 1994).16 
The concept of organizational identification is another interesting area when we compare 
the two Asian companies in our study.  The Chinese company has a strong focus on its 
values, mindset, identity, and ideology.  Loyalty to the company, sacrifice, and being a 
good soldier is emphasized from the initiation phase of employment.  It is obvious that 
having a strong ideological connection with the company's vision and mission is not only 
rewarded, but also demanded by the leaders.  Such level of identification would result in 
a higher and tighter control over decisions and operations of the international firm by the 
Chinese HQ.  In many cases, the overseas employees would most probably not even 
imagine ways to operate that would clash with the Chinese ideology, therefore making it 
easier for the HQ to assess expectations, and foresee the various actions and decisions to 
be made.  
The case of the Japanese company is far from the world of the Chinese firm.  For example, 
after conducting our survey on both the Japanese HQ and the EMEA subsidiary 
employees, the results showed that in neither location did the company have the 
advantage of being recognizable to its employees and other stakeholders.  Not only were 
the strategic goals, vision, mission, and values of the company unidentified by the 
stakeholders, but also more simple aspects of the organizational identity, such as the 
colour and font of the logo, were not recognized or properly remembered by them.  Such 
16 Thus, guanxi becomes a key to the ‘cultural competitive advantages’ of (especially) Chinese 
firms. Empirical studies have also shown that firms with a higher degree of gunaxi tends to have 
a more sustained advantage; be more efficient, and increase long term survival and growth of 
the firms (Lovett & Kali, 1999; Lou, 1997). 
 90 
                                                 
    
loose control over the organizational identity of the Japanese company was described as 
a major problem by the top management team.  However, in the longer run, it might have 
affected the adaptability of local branches and subsidiaries in a more positive way than it 
was imagined.  The autonomy that local managers could exert from such a loose identity 
meant that they were more flexible and enthusiastic, as they were looking for solutions 
within their specific environments rather than trying to carry out a unified strategy 
dictated to them from the HQ.  
In summary, we can distil several elements that jointly contribute to expanding the 
behavioural approach to account for internationalization processes in Asian firms.  
Central to that approach is the question of, what are the determinants of path dependence 
in internationalization processes?   Internationalization can be understood as an adaptive 
process that is characterized by major institutional and cultural challenges.  We provide 
a new way of thinking of such processes.  We view an internationalization process as a 
path dependent process where the actual paths that can be taken are influenced by a 
mixture of random events and firm policies.  In the perspective, it is critical to understand 
the set of potential actions that are available to the firm at any point in time as well as the 
mechanisms that realize particular actions from this set.  Our case studies have 
highlighted a number of such mechanisms relating to psychic distance, organizational 
design, and control of international expansion.  However, internationalization is a long-
term process where the set of potential actions itself may expand or contract.  Our theory 
integrates prior work that views internationalization as a process of learning by doing.  
4.7. Closing & Implications 
Several decades with changes in the global competition and increasing influence of Asian 
firms have brought shifting focus on several fronts.  Not only have functional areas such 
as marketing, strategic planning and strategy become enriched with Asian ideas and 
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values, but also new concepts are being applied to understanding Asian business 
practices.   
We conclude that, based on our findings, it is problematic to consider an MNE as a unitary 
actor.  Each manager's decision matters, and although the effects of culture on individuals 
is undeniable, it is far more difficult to view MNEs as representatives of a specific 
national culture.  Furthermore, the clear effects of organizational design, information 
structure, and control structure on the direction that an organization takes can explain the 
variance in outcomes even in seemingly close and neighbouring firms.  Therefore, 
considering that internationalization is a path dependent activity, we suggest that 
predictions about modes and means of international behaviour in firms strongly depends 
on the decisions that individual managers make in the context of the hierarchy, task 
structure, and external environment, thus making the consideration of these factors crucial 
in understanding the dynamics of MNEs.  
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5.1. Theoretical Contributions 
The history of management has a long tradition of exploring the many facets of using 
control as a means to achieve success. In contrast, our understanding of management 
practices that allow organizations to thrive in uncertain conditions is less complete.  This 
gap in our knowledge highlights some limitations in the guidelines research can offer 
today’s organizations as they are struggling to produce innovations and create value 
(Birkinshaw, 2008).  In response to this shortcoming, a new approach to manage and 
foster novelty, innovation, and change is here suggested.  A new managerial model is 
introduced (Chapter 2) which copes with innovation and its contingencies, such as 
uncertainty and the subjective reluctance that individual human actors commonly 
experience when facing the unknown.   
While the management literature has traditionally emphasized the gains accruing from 
process control, some scholars in economics and management have made serious 
attempts to consider the thorny problem of novelty and the derived challenge of 
management under uncertainty.  Joseph Schumpeter (1934) placed the entrepreneur in 
the centre of the economic life, as the agent who obsessively would seek innovation and 
thereby provoke change.  Alfred Chandler's (1962) idea that “structure follows strategy” 
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also put the entrepreneur and his actions in the limelight, given the inherent uncertainty 
involved in realising a new structural form.  Kenneth Andrews (1971) introduced the 
concept of corporate strategy and distinguished between the formulation and 
implementation of strategy, with the implementation stage being fraught with uncertainty.  
These classical attempts to introduce a wider explanation of managerial activity through 
strategy encourage us, management researchers, to look for the fundamental aspects of 
managerial activity that enable a fruitful handling of uncertainty.  
Innovation activities, as well as scientific research, often involve managing very 
ambiguous problems which implicitly hold high levels of uncertainty.  Traditional forms 
of management are based on strict control, concrete task breakdown, and a clear division 
of labour.  Their application requires a prominent level of certainty, and presents many 
limitations in ambiguous and uncertain situations (Jensen, 2011; Nadal-Burgués & Bonet, 
2012).  Of course, when the desired mode of operation can be realized without uncertain 
change processes, control seems appropriate.  In cases where novelty is promoted, 
uncertainty is only manageable in the absence of control.  
The idea of strategic planning as a way of programming future organizational action is 
commonly questioned as a reasonable premise for understanding organizational change 
(Mintzberg, 1994).  Because plans are incomplete and conditions change in unforeseen 
ways, the goals that are set at the beginning of a change process are rarely realized as 
intended (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Mintzberg, 1994).  For this reason, unforeseen 
events are more likely to conspire against goals that are precise and easy to verify.  A 
reasonable response would therefore be to formulate more vague goals, so that the 
vagueness in goals matches the uncertainty in outcomes.  
Through the present research, specifically in the conceptual paper (Chapter 2), I suggest 
that one way to gradually disambiguate such situations is by means of ongoing 
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interpretation, generating new symbols, and engaging in persuasion.  It is plausible to 
argue that managers’ main activity is to engage into conversations that create forms and 
spaces for interpretation, negotiation, and persuasion (Jensen, 2011).  The art of 
conversation, thus rhetoric, which per the Classics refers to the “art of speaking well”, 
could be incorporated as a new managerial function.  Several studies disclose the role of 
rhetoric in management sciences and offer a conceptual framework to understand how 
managers use language for achieving their aims.  This approach does not only imply the 
logical and argumentative approach resulting in the acceptance of a theory, but also a 
“good understanding of feelings, motivations, purposes and values” (Bonet & Sauquet, 
2010:122).  A profound approach to managing through rhetoric would thereby capture 
the particularities of a situation, recreate them symbolically, and display them as ready to 
be changed through an emergent consensus. 
Depending on the type of problem or goal that needs to be addressed, rhetoric could 
function as a means to absorbing uncertainty (Chapter 2).  The use of rhetorical means 
brings a variety of interpretations, which in turn, generate new options.  As consensus 
starts shaping through persuasion, the use of rhetorical means tends to narrow and 
eventually close the interpretive stage, and as a result, reduces the variety of options.  For 
instance, by introducing a new metaphor – one of the most well-known rhetorical devises 
– there is immediately a chance to invite the generation of new and varied interpretations.  
In this open stage “it is impossible to say which interpretation is the right one” (Jensen, 
2011: 51).  The unintelligibility of such open moments puts the mechanisms of 
interpretation – symbolism, freedom and judgment – to work, in order to bring to the table 
more intelligible options.  For example, since long ago humankind desired to reach the 
moon.  Through history, this old and ambitious project has been subjected to many 
interpretations.  At the very beginning only poets could reach the moon.  Later, in the 16th 
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century, Galileo was the first to see it with detail, and as other numerous scientific 
developments were introduced, finally, in 1969 Neil Alden Armstrong made a giant leap 
for mankind by actually stepping on the moon. Even though small, Armstrong’s steps 
closed the project of traveling from the earth to the moon which through centuries had 
attained many imaginary solutions.  The moon project thus evolved per the interpretations 
given by the people pursuing it, and in accordance with the available resources of their 
time.    
While open moments may facilitate change through emergent consensus, managers are 
often entrenched in very ambiguous situations and “much of the effort in acting in such 
situations depends on the ability to interpret and to act and persuade others” (Jensen, 
2011:54).  As elaborated in Chapter 2, the striking similarity between the stages of 
technical development and managing change and novelty lies in the inherent need to make 
decisions regarding what action to take in the face of incomplete information, ambiguity, 
and/or uncertainty.  
In “How decisions happen in organizations”, James March (1991), emphasized that there 
are other aspects that guide us to an alternative approach to management than that of 
rational-man perspective and physics.  So, in addition to the role that narratives and 
rhetoric play in aiding the practical side of management, they would enable a suitable 
approach to studying organizations.   For instance, Weick’s (1979, 1995) contribution on 
sense-making refers to narratives in organizations and their importance in driving and 
directing change.  In “Translating Organizational Change” (1996), Czarniawska and 
Sevón build on the importance of the narrative perspective by suggesting that narratives 
in organizations reveal the answers to questions about the identity and goal of individuals.   
Drawing on Schutz’s (1953) theory of human intentional action, this idea is pursued in 
the second paper (Chapter 3), by introducing the concept of a mental project – broadly 
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referring to the mental rehearsal of a future act – and building a conceptual framework 
that connects mental projects to narratives.  In line with Mintzberg’s (1994) claim that 
managers should make their contribution around the strategy making process, the idea is 
that mental projects ala Schutz take the form of narratives that managers can believe in.  
In other words, it is conceivable that mental projects can be formulated as narratives that 
managers view as credible promises even though the specifics remain vague.  Narratives 
that can somehow serve as credible promises about outcomes of change processes thus 
connect planned actions with uncertain outcomes.   
In all instances, one could safely allow for a narrative to contain three main elements: a 
plot, that is the sequence of events and their chronological order, a theme, that is the 
overarching meaning or morale of the story, and the setting, which is the context in which 
the events take place.  The structure of intentional human action, as elaborated by Schutz 
(1953) is comparable to the structure of narratives in that it includes a sequence for the 
unfolding of events, which he calls the mental project, and an overarching meaning, 
which is the purpose of the action.  
Giving priority to the narratives and their corresponding mental projects contributes to 
our understanding of MNE’s and change further.  The third paper in this dissertation 
(Chapter 4) asserts that even if the influence of culture and language on types and 
templates of stories is profound, theories of international business do not fully embrace 
the primal nature of narrative types in organizations.  For instance, strong factors like 
language, historical heritage, geographical and climate conditions, political 
predispositions, education systems, religion may affect human actors in an analogous 
way.  This would result in a degree of cultural homogeneity and predictability in the way 
individual human actors generate alternatives and make decisions.  But when it comes to 
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the rhetoric of their narratives about change and other uncertain situations, the situation 
is more open to individual expressions.   
The specific ways, be it cultural or non-cultural, in which each individual manager acts, 
reacts, and interacts with her task environment, with stakeholders, and with HQ, would 
influence the firm’s development along a broad range of paths depending on personal 
style and talent as well as other factors that are shared within a culture.  Moreover, the 
way organization design aggregates individual contributions – e.g. in decision making 
(Christensen & Knudsen, 2010) or search for innovations (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014) – 
appears to have notable effect over and above personal and cultural factors.  As illustrated 
in our cases studies, organization design had a notable effect regarding what kind of 
information that was aggregated, i.e. information regarding process in the Chinese MNE 
and regarding outcome in the Japanese MNE.   
 
5.2. Implications 
In addition to implications for research, as described in the previous section, 
understanding the role of narratives and rhetoric in the context of uncertainty, i.e. change, 
is of crucial importance to managers and instigators of change in an organization.  It is 
important for practitioners and scholars to recognise the need for allowing enough 
vagueness in the change goals, or in the processes, as keeping both rigid would not be a 
reasonable option.  The contextual demands and uncertainties of change would require 
the actor to make decisions, no matter how incomplete their knowledge might be.  
Handing down a detailed point by point plan of change where nothing is negotiable would 
not ease the project of change, as individuals would have to compromise either the 
process or the final goal, to cope with the demands of their ever-changing environment.  
On the other hand, keeping a considerable level of vagueness in both, process and 
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outcome, is only advisable in the primary stages of strategy development, since going 
forward with a huge level of uncertainty simultaneously in process and outcome would 
lead to difficulties such as coordination problems and political (ab)use of narratives, 
where stories are made to fit personal gains before firms’ gains. 
Furthermore, when studying an organization, or managing one, it is problematic to 
consider a firm as a unitary actor.  Every narrative prioritizes a unique aspect of the 
organization which, in effect, has the potential to destabilize the whole ideology and 
operations of a firm.  Each manager's decision matters, and although the effects of culture 
on individuals is undeniable, it is far more difficult to view any firm as a representative 
of a specific culture, national or otherwise, just because of its location, the national culture 
of its managers, or proximity to a cluster of competencies.  The clear effects of 
organizational design, information structure, and control structure on the direction that an 
organization takes can explain the variance in outcomes even in seemingly close and 
neighbouring firms.   
 
5.3. Limitations 
So far it has been emphasised that narratives play a multitude of roles when it comes to 
managing uncertainty and creating meaning.  They also form strategy, i.e. decisions about 
the future, and dictate the outcome of organizational change efforts.  It is, however, not 
the end of the road to understand the role of narratives and the potentials they could 
unlock.  Some limitations to the current work include lack of generalizability, and 
limitation in number of perspectives attained.  Not every story in the organization was 
heard, since the interviews were confined to managerial levels.  Meanwhile, there is 
always the possibility to dig deeper into the narratives and discover more layers of 
meaning.  
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Though this dissertation has provided examples of types and functions of narratives, still 
there is not a classification of the types of narratives that would correspond to each and 
every specific scenario of change.  It is probably naïve to assume that such a clear and 
precise classification is possible at all, but ignoring the gap is also imprudent.  Future 
research opportunities, then, would focus on discovering basic attributes of each problem 
that would best be addressed by a specific rhetoric and narrative type.  For example, based 
on the level of flexibility, vagueness, or freedom associated with each task or project, a 
specific class of narrative and rhetoric type would be preferable to others.  This would 
contribute to our understanding of the function of narratives in organizations, meanwhile, 
enable managers to engage in the appropriate rhetoric and enjoy the most fruitful class of 
narratives in order to maintain and improve their organizations.  
 
5.4. Further Research and Closing 
To continue with the theme and findings of this dissertation, further research could be 
conducted with two main aims.  First, by studying a multitude of organizations during a 
change project, one could make a statement about the applicability of narrative types and 
rhetoric to various organizational structures.  Finding failure cases, where disregarding 
the type of narratives, the change project is judged to be unsuccessful, would also yield a 
better understanding and classification of narratives and their usage.  
Second, by expanding the depth of analyses of narrative types, one could possibly extract 
finer nuances in the relationship between intentional action and narratives, as well as the 
dynamics among the actors and the interpreters of the acts.  The language in which a 
narrative is manifested is manifold and complex, as it encompasses syntax, semantics, 
and pragmatics.  To add to the complexity, there is also the context, such as body language 
and tone.  Studying a narrative using multiple research methods and fine-tuning the 
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relationship among its building blocks would pave the way to, perhaps, conducting 
laboratory experiments, where the results would take the discourse on narratives and 
rhetoric to a new level altogether. 
To sum up, I would like to note that the importance of clarity, both through research and 
through the stories we tell, is compatible to the importance of the ambiguity and the 
unknown.  As dealing with uncertainty is an inevitable part of our human experience, it 
seems plausible to value vagueness as well as the well-known. 
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